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This paper estimates a fiscal policy reaction function in order to investigate the links 
between financial and real estate market movements and fiscal policy outcomes. An 
increase in asset prices affects in a positive and significant manner primary balances, 
with the response reflecting both an increase in government revenues and a fall in 
government spending. The most important impact on fiscal balances is due to 
changes in residential property prices. Changes in equity and commercial property 
prices are also important determinants of fiscal balances. Our findings suggest that 
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  41. Introduction 
In the midst of the on-going macroeconomic and financial market crisis, fiscal 
policy making has been at the forefront. Several governments around the globe have 
decided to undertake a significant fiscal impulse to boost economic activity. These 
actions involved both discretionary demand boosting measures, as well as measures 
to restore financial stability in the banking sector i.e., equity injections, subsidies, 
asset purchases, loan guarantees etc. Moreover, monetary authorities around the 
world, in response to the crisis, have engaged in an unprecedented monetary easing. 
The recent economic and financial market developments go hand in hand with 
a significant fall in asset prices, which in several asset classes and countries resemble 
the case of an asset price bust, following several years of asset price boom (e.g., 
house price developments in Ireland, the UK, Spain and the US). These 
developments had significant implications for fiscal balances, both through automatic 
and discretionary fiscal policy responses.  
Given that the links between the real economy and the financial sector could 
pose risks to economic and financial stability, one of the issues arising is to better 
understand the feedback loops between government activity and financial and real 
estate markets. The IMF (2009a) states that “continued favourable treatment of 
housing in many countries has supported high housing prices, while mortgage 
interest relief—where it remains—may have encouraged heavy household leverage.
 1 
The risks in distorting a market so central to financial stability reinforce long-
standing efficiency and equity arguments for more neutral taxation.” Finally, the IMF 
(2009a) concludes that “tax measures can have significant effects on asset price 
dynamics, but are unlikely to be the best way to deal with bubbles”. However, early 
alleviation of tax distortions could have contributed to reducing the impact of factors 
that have facilitated excessive leveraging and led to high debt levels, paving, thus, 
the way for the recent financial crisis (IMF, 2009a).  As pointed out by Wolswijk 
(2010), fiscal instruments may be useful either for preventing or for correcting some 
housing market disequilibrium. Moreover, “structural fiscal measures such as 
reducing mortgage interest relief and increasing reliance on quick adjustments of tax 
                                                 
1 IMF (2009a) discusses links between tax policy issues, excessive leveraging and the development of asset price 
bubbles.   
  5bases to market price developments appear to be useful options for governments for 
limiting growth rates of mortgages and house prices”.
 2
Furthermore, as economic conditions improve
3 the policy focus will shift to the 
sustainability of fiscal balances implying that governments will start withdrawing the 
sizeable fiscal policy stimulus packages and the financial sector support schemes. In 
view of the forthcoming gradual economic recovery, asset prices have started to 
improve (see BIS, 2009; IMF, 2010), which provides a boost to public finances, 
through the revenue channel. However, given that uncertainty remains high and that 
the recovery might be more gradual than expected, this could have significant effects, 
in terms of volatility, on asset markets and asset prices, which have a negative 
feedback effect on fiscal balances and the fiscal consolidation effort.
4  
The on-going crisis is a very rare episode in terms of its severe and world wide 
implications and because of the strong and coordinated policy responses that 
followed it. However, it could certainly imply that fiscal policy makers might put 
more of their attention on financial and real estate market developments and might 
try to avert analogous events in future years. Moreover, although governments have 
not (prior to the current crisis) publicly announced measures or their intention to 
stabilize the financial system and asset price movements, it could be the case that 
over the course of recent years they have gradually paid more attention to financial 
and real estate market developments. Therefore, it is of real interest to better 
understand fiscal responses to asset price changes, as well as to economic shocks, 
and how the two interrelate and constrain government reaction.  
 
                                                 
2 Ireland has recently used tax measures to bolster house prices (removed tax duty on first time buyers and 
extended mortgage interest relief), the 2003 cuts in dividend taxation and capitals gains tax in the US is estimated 
to have increased share prices by about 6 percent (IMF, 2009a), whereas Korea took measures to curb house price 
increases in 2005 (national level progressive property tax) and 2007 (progressive capital gains tax). 
3 On July 7, 2010 the IMF pubished updated World Economic Outlook projections pointing to rebounding 
economic activity, stronger than previously anticipated. Moreover, financial markets recovered faster than 
expected, helped by strengthening economic activity. 
4 According to the 2010 Global Risk report of the World Economic Forum “ the risk of an asset price collapse 
remains the strongest risk” which “illustrates the continuing uncertainty about the resilience of the global 
economy and the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary  responses, governance and regulation”. Furthermore, as 
stated by the G20 Finance Ministers at the June 2010 meeting in the Republic of Korea “the global economy 
continues to recover faster than anticipated”, however, “the recent volatility in financial markets reminds us that 
significant challenges remain” and that “the recent events highlight the importance of sustainable public finances 
and the need for countries to put in place credible, growth-friendly measures, to deliver fiscal sustainability”. 
  6In addition, as noted by Cottarelli and Viñals (2009), the design and 
implementation of strategies for the management of private sector assets acquired by 
governments during the crisis should also support fiscal exit strategies, i.e., fiscal 
consolidation strategies. As the authors point out: “ Policies should also ensure 
adequate recovery of the value of assets acquired by the public sector during the 
crisis.” In this regard, the design and implementation and success of fiscal 
consolidation strategies can both affect and be affected by asset price developments.
5  
While there has been an extensive literature on the appropriate monetary policy 
making in response to asset price movement (e.g., see Borio and Lowe 2002; Detken 
and Smetts 2004; Miskin and White 2003; Bordo and Jeanne 2002a, 2002b), the 
literature on the appropriate fiscal policy response is far less developed. In addition, 
there is only limited empirical evidence on the linkages between government 
finances and asset prices and on whether fiscal policy has been affected by asset 
prices changes. 
A series of recent contributions investigate the effects that financial market 
movements and in particular asset price changes have on fiscal balances (e.g., 
Eschenbanch and Schuknecht 2002, Jaeger and Schuknecht 2004, Morris and 
Schucknecht 2007). These were motivated by the asset price boom of the late 1990s 
and the windfall revenues it generated, which were then deemed as being of a 
structural nature leading to permanent improvement in fiscal positions. However, the 
subsequent burst of the asset price bubble led to a significant deterioration of fiscal 
balances, hindering the sustainability of fiscal positions and limiting the budgetary 
room for maneuver during the downturn of the early 2000s. Therefore, most 
contributions focus on whether fiscal revenues should be adjusted both for the 
economic and the asset price cycle. Another class of studies like Honohan and 
Kliengebiel (2003), Schuknect and Eschenbanch (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
and European Commission (2009) discuss in detail the fiscal implications of past 
financial and banking crises. 
 
                                                 
5 Cottarelli and Viñals (2009) point out that “country authorities may occasionally face trade-offs between rapidly 
reselling assets to the private sector as soon as acquired banks or companies return to profitability, against a more 
gradual approach that might ultimately yield larger gains to the government’s budget”. See also IMF (2009b) for 
a broader discussion, on crisis-related measures in the financial system and sovereign balance sheet risks. 
  7The present paper builds on these earlier contributions and investigates the 
links between financial market movements and fiscal policy developments. It goes 
beyond the aforementioned studies (i.e., on whether government revenues should be 
adjusted both for the economic and the asset price cycle) in that it investigates, by 
means of fiscal policy reaction functions whether there is any evidence that fiscal 
balances (primary balances, current expenditure and current revenue) have been 
affected by or responded to financial and real estate market movements (i.e., changes 
in residential, commercial property and equity prices and  changes in the slope of the 
yield curve).  
Following several studies in the literature (e.g., Gali and Perotti 2003, Celasun 
et al 2006, Celasun and Kang 2006, Golinelli and Momigliano 2009, Afonso and 
Hauptmeir 2009), we estimate fiscal policy reaction functions or fiscal policy rules in 
order to identify a stable relationship between the fiscal policy variable of interest 
and financial market variables and to better understand whether financial market 
developments might shape and be correlated with policy makers’ decisions and their 
debt sustainability and cyclical stabilization motives. Therefore, we try to understand 
how fiscal policy responds to or is affected by financial and real estate market 
changes (e.g. asset price changes) and real economy developments and how the two 
interrelate and constrain or reinforce government reaction.
6  
These issues are particularly relevant and should be taken on board by policy 
makers because financial market developments (like a steeper yield curve) might 
reflect market concerns regarding the sustainability of a country’s fiscal position. 
Furthermore, asset price movements are relevant for the following reasons: (1) they 
should be controlled for in order for the policy maker to have a better grasp of the 
actual cyclically adjusted fiscal stance
7; (2) they could carry information on cyclical 
economic conditions, on top of the information provided by economic activity 
                                                 
6 For example, if a government wants to engage in pro-cyclical fiscal tightening when the economy is still below 
trend (as in the current juncture) and asset prices increase fast, then fiscal balances will be affected positively. 
However, if this asset price increase is reverted then the consolidation effort would be disrupted both due to an 
automatic response and because there might be wider implications for the financial system, warranting 
discretionary fiscal action. 
7For example, the measures of fiscal policy stance (cyclically adjusted primary balances or structural balance) 
used for policy analysis and fiscal surveillance by international institutions (see e.g.,  IMF,2010; OECD, 2008; 
European Commission, 2009) are only corrected for the economic cycle (output gap movements) and, at times, 
one-off policy changes.  
  8variables. This would imply that fiscal policy makers should build up fiscal buffer 
(e.g., by using windfall revenues) for rainy days to come when economic conditions 
are good and when asset prices are booming.  
Our findings suggest that financial market variables play a very important role. 
An increase in asset prices affects in a positive and significant manner primary 
balances, with the response reflecting both an increase in government revenues and a 
cut in government spending. The most important impact on fiscal balances is due to 
changes in residential property prices. Equity price changes and commercial property 
price changes were also found to be important determinants of fiscal balances. The 
importance of residential property and equity prices as determinant of primary 
balances has increased over the course of the years. The effect of residential property 
prices, in recent years, reflects an automatic rather than a discretionary response of 
cyclically adjusted fiscal balances. In the case of equity prices, there is both an 
automatic and a discetionary response. The steepening of the slope of the yield curve 
contributes to fiscal discipline, in particular in recent years, by inducing expenditure 
cuts. 
Section 2 summarizes previous findings and discusses potential channels of 
interaction between financial and real estate market movements and budgetary 
outcomes. Section 3 discusses methodological issues and presents the data and the 
empirical model. Section 4 presents the main findings. Robustness analysis is 
conducted in section 5. The last section summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
 
2. Financial markets movements and interactions with budgetary 
outcomes: previous work and theoretical background 
2.1 Previous work 
As stated beforehand, earlier contributions focus on whether fiscal balances 
and in particular government revenues should be adjusted both for the economic and 
the asset price cycle or discuss the fiscal implications of past financial and banking 
crises.  In this section, we summarize the most relevant papers related to the current 
study. 
  9Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004), focusing on three asset classes - equities, 
residential property and commercial property - examine the effect of boom and bust 
phases in asset prices on fiscal policy behavior. After identifying boom and bust 
phases in asset prices, they examine whether these coincide with output gap and 
output growth developments. They found that (i) expansions and contractions in 
economic activity during such boom-bust phases in asset prices tend to be highly 
persistent, (ii) conventional estimates of tax elasticities are not accurate, leading to a 
biased assessment of the fiscal stance and the underlying fiscal position in boom-bust 
phases, (iii) boom-bust phases exacerbate existing pro-cyclical policy biases, and 
political economy biases toward higher spending and public debt ratios.  
On the other hand, Morris and Schucknecht (2007) investigate the impact that 
asset prices have on fiscal revenues. They estimate short and long-run revenue 
elasticities with respect to equity and real estate price indices for 16 OECD countries. 
For a sub-sample of euro area countries, they use these elasticities to investigate the 
impact of asset prices on budget balances and the assessment of the fiscal stance by 
adjusting existing estimates of cyclically adjusted balances for the asset price 
“cycle”. Asset prices changes are found to be a major factor behind unexplained 
changes in cyclically adjusted balances. Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) investigate 
what determines overall, non-cyclically adjusted, fiscal balances in 22 OECD 
countries. The empirical analysis shows that asset prices (housing and equity prices) 
affect budgetary outcomes, but their effect is limited in normal times.  
Eschenbanch and Schuknecht (2002) examine econometrically the effect of 
asset prices on fiscal balances via the revenue channels, i.e., via direct, indirect and 
capital turnover taxes. They find that a 10% change in stock and real estate prices 
affects the fiscal balance by on average 0.4% of GDP in most industrialized OECD 
countries with values ranging from 0.1% to 0.8% of GDP depending on the country.  
Schuknecht and Eschenbanch (2004) investigate the effect that asset prices have on 
fiscal balances via expenditure and government financial activities by focusing on 
specific countries (UK and Sweden) that have experienced strong asset price 
fluctuations, financial instability and government bailouts. They conclude that 
financial instability increases the variability of fiscal balances. Sweden and the UK 
experienced in the late 1980s-early 1990s a dramatic deterioration in fiscal balances 
  10by 9% and 16%, respectively. According to Schuknect and Eschenbanch (2004) 40-
50% of this deterioration was due to asset price and financial instability related 
effects on revenues and financial sector bail-out costs. Moreover, the authors report 
that financial instability led to significant debt ratio increases in six industrialized 
countries (Sweden, Finland, Japan, France, UK, Switzerland) ranging from 11 to 
50% of GDP.  
Honohan and Kliengebiel (2003) and European Commission (2009) discuss in 
detail the fiscal implications of past financial and banking crises. Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) construct a new dataset of systemic banking crises. According to 
these papers, excluding the on-going crisis which is not covered by our sample, past 
banking and financial crisis that affected OECD countries and required public 
intervention occurred in Australia in 1989-1992, in Finland in 1991-1994, in France 
in 1994-1995, in Japan in 1992-2005, in Sweden in 1991-1994, in the US in 1981-
1991 and 1998, and in Norway in 1987.  
Moreover, as is shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), financial and banking 
crisis have substantial implications. First of all, the collapse of asset markets is deep 
and prolonged. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that “on a peak-to-trough basis, real 
housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over six years, while equity 
price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three and a half years.” 
The unemployment rate rises by about 7 percentage points over the four years of the 
down phase of the cycle and  output falls by about 9 percent, but the duration of the 
downturn last only two years. In the aftermath of several financial crises the real 
value of government debt (not the debt to GDP ratio) rose on average by 86 percent 
in a panel of developed and developing economies. According to Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) “the big drivers of debt increases are the inevitable collapse in tax 
revenues that governments suffer in the wake of deep and prolonged output 
contractions, as well as often ambitious countercyclical fiscal policies aimed at 
mitigating the downturn”.  Moreover, the authors find in a companion paper 
  11(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) that the widely cited costs of bailing out and 
recapitalizing the banking system are not the main cause of debt explosions.
8  
 
2.2 Theoretical background: potential channels of interaction between financial 
market movements and budgetary outcomes 
As has been discussed by relevant literature, e.g., Eschenbach and Schuknecht 
(2002),  Honohan and Kliengebiel (2003), Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2004), 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, 2009) and European Commission (2009) , financial 
markets and in particular asset prices can affect the budget via a series of channels. 
Directly via certain revenue categories, e.g., capital gains-losses related taxes. These 
affect direct taxes on households and corporations. Moreover, the government raises 
revenues via transactions in assets, the so-called turnover taxes
9. Indirectly, via a 
feedback loop from asset prices to the real economy. Higher asset prices raise 
consumer confidence and consumption, via the wealth effect, and increase the 
collection of indirect taxes. Moreover, in case of asset price busts and ailing financial 
institutions, the state might be asked to intervene bearing some of the costs. The 
government’s intervention to bailout financial institutions affects public finances via 
several channels. In the case that they take the form of budgetary subsidies or 
expenditures, they directly affect the budget deficit. However, if they take the form 
of financial transactions, e.g., purchase of assets or equity injections, they will affect 
only the debt ratio. In case of guarantees extended to the private sector, the 
government will be burdened only at the time that the guarantees on loans are called 
in.  
There is an additional indirect channel, i.e., if the asset price bust leads to 
financial instability and induces a negative feedback loop on economic activity, the 
                                                 
8 Ardagna (2009) adopts a somewhat different perspective investigating the behavior of financial markets around 
large changes in fiscal stance. Whereas, Tagkalakis (2009) investigates the impact of asset price changes on the 
probability to initiate and successfully conclude a fiscal consolidation effort. Ardagna (2009) shows that stock 
market prices surge around times of substantial fiscal tightening and plunge in periods of very loose fiscal policy. 
Hence, financial markets appear to welcome fiscal consolidation efforts and punish governments that have a loose 
fiscal stance, i.e., they seem to react in anticipation of the future path of government debt-to-GDP ratio. In 
addition, Ardagna (2009) shows that fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of 
government deficit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and 
substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger increases in stock market prices. Tagkalakis 
(2009) finds that a pick up in asset prices increases the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment. However, this 
does not always lead to a sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances.  
9 See also Appendix 1.  
  12government might have to undertake expansionary fiscal measures to avert the 
danger of a full blown economic recession, leading to a deterioration of its budgetary 
position (see e.g., European Commission, 2009).
10
Turning now to the yield curve, we know that (usually) it has a positive slope 
(the difference between the long and short-term nominal interest rates), which 
implies that yields rise as maturity lengthens (see James and Webber 2001, Cairns 
2004). A positive slope reflects that economic prospects will improve and that 
inflation will further rise in the future, which means that there are expectations of 
tighter monetary policy in the future to dampen inflationary pressures.
11 This means 
that investors will require a higher risk premium associated with future inflation 
uncertainty. This will be reflected in higher long-term interest rates. In addition, the 
fact that an economy faces more uncertainty about future events, which are likely to 
impact on investments, can lead to higher long-term rates. Moreover, if financial 
markets perceive that there will be greater risks in the future in terms of the long-
term sustainability of public finances, then this will be translated into higher spread 
between long-term and short-term nominal interest rates.
12  
Therefore, an increase in the differential between long and short-term nominal 
interest rates (or the slope of the yield curve) can have significant implications for 
fiscal balances to the extent that it implies an increase in debt servicing costs and the 
debt ratio.
13 This market disciplining effect is likely to contribute to fiscal 
consolidation. 
                                                 
10 The performance of financial and real estate market movements can affect public pension reserve funds, which 
support social security systems, to the extent they have invested in these asset classes.  This could affect the 
viability of social security systems, in case asset prices deteriorate sharply, which could impact on social security 
spending and related benefits (lowering pension related expenditures), as well as on the level of contributions 
paid by employers and employees (increasing the contributions paid to improve the viability of the system). 
According to OECD (2010), public pension reserve funds in some countries were hit badly by the financial crisis 
during 2008. However thanks to the rebound in equity prices that started in March 2009 they experience a strong 
recovery in performance in 2009, which largely made up for the losses suffered in the previous year.  
11 According to the arbitrage pricing theory, if investors expect a future rise in the risk free rate, then it is better to 
postpone their investment in order to receive a better rate in the future. Those investors willing to invest now will 
have to be compensated for the future rate rise.  
12 The slope of the yield curve is also influenced by current demand and supply factors for debt instruments in 
different maturities irrespective of market’s views about future events. For example, if the demand for long-term 
government bonds exceeds their supply their yield can fall. 
13 However, in cases of rising long-term interest rates, governments usually tend to substitute away from long-
term debt instruments to medium and short-term debt instruments in order to alleviate the impact of rising rates 
on debt servicing. Therefore, an increase in the differential between the long and short-term interest rates might 
not increase immediately debt servicing costs. This strategy cannot be pursued for long, as it will reduce the 
average duration of outstanding debt, increasing the uncertainty and volatility of debt servicing.  
  133. DATA, methodological issues and the empirical model 
3.1 Data 
We used a yearly unbalanced panel data set (1970-2005) of 17 OECD 
economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, 
and the United States. The macroeconomic variables used extend from 1970 to 2005 
and are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook (2008). The definitions used are: 
primary balance as a percent of GDP (PBY), cyclically adjusted primary balance as a 
percent of GDP (CAPBY), debt ratio as a percent of GDP (Debt), current 
expenditure excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP (CDXY), current 
revenue excluding interest receipts as a percent of GDP (CRXY), output gap (ygap), 
the short-term nominal interest rate, the long-term nominal interest rate, and the GDP 
deflator. The difference between the long and short-term nominal interest rates is 
used as a proxy for the slope of the yield curve. The inflation variable reported is the 
GDP deflator based inflation rate.   
 Following previous studies, e.g,. Borio and Lowe (2002), Detken and Smetts 
(2004), Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) our asset price indicators are taken from the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The main indicator is the growth rate of the 
annual aggregate real asset prices (AP), which covers 1970-2005 for 17 industrial 
countries and combines price indices for three asset classes - equities, residential 
property and commercial property – by weighting the components using shares of the 
asset classes in private sector wealth. The private consumption deflator is used to 
convert nominal to real asset prices. In addition, we consider also the growth rates of 
the three disaggregated asset price indicators, i.e., real commercial prices (CP), real 
residential prices (RP) and real equity prices (EP).
14  
 
3.2 Methodological issues  
Following earlier studies (e.g., Gali and Perotti, 2003; Celasun et al 2006; 
Celasun and Kang, 2006; Golinelli and Momigliano, 2009; Afonso and Hauptmeir, 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 2 for additional information on data sources, definitions and descriptive statistics. 
  142009), we aim to identify the factors that might shape and be correlated with policy 
makers’ decisions. In our case we estimate fiscal policy reaction functions 
augmented with asset price variables, this way we explore whether asset price swings 
have influenced the fiscal policy stance, as well as whether they have been taken into 
account by policy makers in their effort to stabilize the economy.   
Fiscal policy reaction functions usually have been examined for two reasons: 
(1) to investigate whether authorities are driven by debt stabilization and 
sustainability motives; and (2) to examine the cyclical stabilization properties of 
fiscal policy. In the first case, this would imply a positive response of budget 
balances (primary balance or the cyclically adjusted primary balance) to the debt to 
GDP ratio. Several studies have found positive evidence on this, e.g., Celasun et al 
(2006), Afonso and Hauptmeir (2009), Golinelli and Momigliano (2009). In the 
second case, one would expect that budget balances would react negatively to either 
the output gap or the GDP growth rate, i.e., that fiscal policy would be 
countercyclical. Evidence is mixed here. For example, Bernoth et al. (2008) using the 
measurement error made in the real time evaluation of the output gap find a 
countercyclical fiscal policy response. Forni and Momigliano (2004) working with 
real time output gap data find a countercyclical response when output gaps are 
negative. According to Celasun et al. (2006), primary balances react in a 
countercyclical manner to output gap, but they attribute this to the worsening of 
fiscal balances in recessions, rather than improvements during booms. Afonso and 
Hauptmeir (2009) find an acyclical response, whereas Gali and Perotti (2003) find a 
pro-cyclical response before Maastricht and an acyclical response in the post-
Maastricht period. Candelon et al (2010) cast doubt on the findings reported by Gali 
and Perotti (2003) and present evidence of a procyclical fiscal policy in the post-
Maastrich era.
15 Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) find evidence in favor of a pro-
                                                 
15 Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) based on real time data differentiate between fiscal plans and their 
implematation for OECD countries over the period 1995-2006 and find that there are marked differences in 
behavior between the planning and implementation stages, as well as between the fiscal policy of EU countries 
and other OECD countries. Planned fiscal policy is acyclical for EU countries and countercyclical for the other 
OECD countries. However, in the implementation stage, the EU countries react procyclically to unexpected 
changes in the output gap, while the responses of the other OECD countries are a-cyclical. 
  15cyclical response and present an extensive discussion of earlier studies where it is 
shown that in most cases fiscal policy is either pro-cyclical or acyclical.
16  
Fiscal policy reaction functions have been examined for additional reasons. For 
example, Claeys (2006) examines, on top of the debt sustainability and cyclical 
stabilization motives of a fiscal policy maker, whether there is any interaction with 
the setting of monetary policy. To this end he augments the fiscal reaction function 
with the short-term interest rate (central bank rate), while also taking into account the 
deviation of inflation from target in line with Benigno and Woodford (2003). The 
assumption employed by Claeys (2006) is that reactions to the central bank rate are 
backward looking, because fiscal policy is set infrequently, whereas monetary policy 
can react immediately, anticipating any fiscal policy response. In some of the 
countries examined (e.g., Austria, the Netherlands), fiscal policy is found to be set as 
a substitute to monetary policy, i.e., an interest rate hike of 1% lowers primary 
surpluses by about 0.3% of GDP. Moreover, Claeys (2006) reports that a pick up in 
inflation leads to a tighter fiscal stance in these countries, implying that in the context 
of the EMU fiscal policy plays a role in targeting inflation and stabilizing the 
economy.
 17  
Celasun et al. (2006) examine primary surplus behavior and risks to fiscal 
sustainability in emerging market economies. On top of the typical determinants of 
primary balances, e.g., the outstanding level of public debt and the gap between 
actual and trend output, they consider factors that are likely to be important drivers of 
primary balances such as, the real oil price, institutional quality, whether the country 
is in a state of sovereign default  and whether it is committed to an IMF program. 
According to the findings of the paper, a pick-up in real oil prices contributes 
positively to primary balances. Countries in default (with restricted market access) 
and those involved in IMF supported programs run higher surpluses. Improvements 
                                                 
16 According to Iltzeki and Végh  (2008) fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries. Interestingly enough 
and contrary to the typical finding in the literature they also find substantial evidence of procyclicality in high-
income countries. Moreover, the authors find a significant expansionary effect of government consumption on 
output in developing countries. This provides empirical support for the when-it-rains-it-pours hypothesis: 
procyclical government consumption in developing countries implies that fiscal policy exacerbates the business 
cycle. The authors also find some support for this channel in high-income countries. 
17 According to Claeys (2006) the relevance of fiscal policy interactions with monetary policy variables extents 
beyond the EMU. The hypothesis that interest rates and inflation are not significant elements in the fiscal rule 
cannot be rejected in Japan, Germany and France, but it is rejected in the US, Italy, the UK, Spain, Netherlands, 
and Austria.  
  16in institutional quality (which imply decreases in borrowing costs) are accosiated 
with lower fiscal effort.   
 
3.3 The empirical model 
We estimate a fiscal policy reaction function as in (1), where i (i=1…N) stands 
for country and index t (t=1..T) indicates period: 
Sit = α1Sit-1 + α2ygapit+ α3Dit-1+ α4Xit+ ηi +λt+εit                  (1) 
ηi and λt stand for unobserved country and time effects, respectively. Time effects are 
used in order to reduce the omitted variable bias from the simple specification used 
(see Afonso and Hauptmeier 2009, Golinelli and Momigliano 2009). St is the ratio of 
the primary balance to GDP, ygapt is the cyclical indicator (output gap), Dit-1 stands 
for the lagged debt to GDP ratio, and Xt are financial market variables. In principle, 
one should have used the term Et-1ygapit , which is the output gap at time t expected 
at time t-1, reflecting the fact that, usually, fiscal policy decisions for the next year 
(the budget law) are taken in the autumn of t-1. As stated in Gollineli and 
Momigliano (2009), by using the contemporaneous value of the output gap, one 
refers to the year in which budgetary actions are in effect, whereas using its lagged 
value (t-1) reflects the time when budgetary decisions are taken. However, as pointed 
out by the authors, both options “lead to similar results, since values of the output 
gap are highly persistent”. The response to the cyclical component captures the 
systematic discretionary and automatic responses; εit is the random component, 
which could be perceived as reflecting the non-systematic policy response or the 
fiscal policy shocks, which are independent across countries.
18  
Our fiscal policy variable of interest is the ratio of the primary balance to GDP 
(as in e.g., Clayes 2006, Balassone et al. 2008, Afonso and Hauptmeir 2009) and not 
its cyclically adjusted value. This is done for two reasons: (1) to avoid the caveats in 
estimating cyclically adjusted balances, i.e., defining trend/potential output (see, 
Tujula and Wolswijk 2008); and (2) because policy makers are often more concerned 
                                                 
18According to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gali and Perotti (2003), fiscal policy actions are decomposed 
into: (1) the automatic responses of spending and taxes to cyclical economic conditions; (2) the systematic 
discretionary response of fiscal variables to macroeconomic developments; and (3) the shock component or 
unanticipated discretionary fiscal policy actions.  
  17with, and can observe contemporaneously only, the headline or non cyclically 
adjusted figures.
19  
Nevertheless, the distinction between the discretionary and cyclical (or 
automatic) fiscal policy responses is a relevant one. In the case of the non-adjusted 
primary balance, the coefficient on the output gap will reflect both the automatic 
response and the discretionary response to the economic cycle (output gap). In the 
case of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, the coefficient on the output gap will 
reflect only the discretionary response to the economic cycle. This distinction could 
also interact and affect the response of the fiscal policy makers to asset price 
changes. To this end, and as a robustness test, we will also examine the impact of 
asset price changes on cyclically adjusted primary balances.  
A significant effect of asset price changes on cyclically adjusted primary 
balances would suggest that asset prices affect fiscal balances independently and on 
top of variations in cyclical economic conditions (output gap). Therefore, this implies 
that the policy maker explicitly responds to asset price changes. Alternatively, if the 
policy maker does not take into account asset prices and does not respond 
intentionally to their movements, then the significant impact of asset prices on 
cyclically adjusted primary balances merely reflects the fact that the policy maker 
does not have a full grasp of his or her main policy instrument (the fiscal stance).
20 
This limits his or her ability to effectively stabilize economic activity and to address 
debt sustainability concerns. Hence, the fiscal policy maker should take into account 
asset price changes when forming his or her policy decisions (e.g., by correcting 
fiscal balances for asset price movements).  
Later on we will also investigate the effect of asset price movements on 
government revenue and spending. A significant and positive effect on government 
revenue following a pick up in asset prices will most likely reflect an automatic (non-
discretionary) fiscal policy response. On the other hand, a significant impact effect 
                                                 
19 As stated in Golinelli and Momigliano (2009), “the use of the primary balance instead of the overall balance 
reflects the fact that the reaction to interest payments should be essentially captured by the debt variable” . 
20 This could be the case because the discretionary fiscal policy stance we are using (and is also used by fiscal 
policy makers and international institutions like the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission to assess 
fiscal policy developments and to conduct fiscal policy surveillance) is only net out of the effect of the output 
gap, whereas it is not net out of the automatic effect of asset price changes, which mainly comes from the revenue 
side. See for example, OECD (2008), European Commission (2009), IMF (2010), where the biggest focus is on 
cyclically adjusted primary balances (or structural balance), where no account is taken of asset price movements.  
  18on government spending will most likely reflect a discretionary fiscal policy 
response to asset price changes (given that there no spending items that respond 
contemporaneously and in an automatic manner to asset price movements).  
 Following previous studies (e.g., Gali and Perotti 2003, European Commission 
2006, Clayes 2006), we use the output gap in levels as indicator of the cyclical 
conditions. By focusing on the output gap we are interested in whether the economy 
is above or below trend (its potential); the use of output growth would hint at 
whether the economy is in upturn or downturn. However,  the economy could 
register positive growth rates and still be below trend, which makes the output gap 
more relevant for assessing cyclical economic conditions.  
We use the growth rate of each asset price indicator because we want to 
investigate the abrupt changes in asset prices and their impact on fiscal balances. In 
any case, investigating whether asset prices are above or below trend and defining 
their trend value is highly contentious. In principle, this should not only involve 
simple statistical techniques like applying Hodrick-Prescott filters, but it should 
investigate whether asset prices are above or below the value which is justified by 
economic fundamentals. Moreover, policymakers and economic actors care more 
about the implications of, and observe, the abrupt changes in asset prices rather than 
whether they are above or below trend.  
Given the fact that there is a feedback from cyclical economic activity to 
financial markets, e.g., asset prices, it would be important to net out this effect to the 
extent possible. Although the correlation coefficients between the output gap and the 
changes in asset price variables are not very big (the biggest one is 0.45 for 
residential property prices; see Appendix 2, Table 18), it might be the case that part 
of the fiscal policy response to the asset price variable is due also to variations in 
cyclical economic conditions (to the feedback from output gap movements to asset 
price changes), i.e., the asset price variable captures part of the output gap effect. 
Multicollinearity between the two variables could possibly render insignificant and 
reduce substantially the size of the coefficient estimate on the output gap. To address 
this concern, we regress each asset price variable on the contemporaneous and the 
first and second lagged values of the output gap variable. In a similar vein to Buch et 
  19al. (2010), we then use as our asset price variables the residuals from these four 
regressions (respectively for aggregate asset prices (RAP), residential (RRP), 
commercial property (RCP) and equity prices (REP)).
21 Each of these new asset price 
variables will be practically uncorrelated (orthogonal) with the output gap (see 
Appendix 2, Table 18) and their coefficient estimates will solely reflect their impact 
on fiscal balances (cyclically or non cyclically adjusted), independent of any output 
gap movements. 
The presence of a lagged dependent variable implies that estimating equation 
(1) with fixed effect OLS and IV estimators render the coefficient estimates 
inconsistent. Following Celasun et al. (2006) and Gollineli and Momigliano (2009), 
we take into account the possibility of endogeneity of the output gap with 
contemporaneous fiscal shocks. To this end, we instrument it with variables 
exogenous to the idiosyncratic primary balance shocks. The most appropriate 
estimation technique is to employ a dynamic panel data one-step system GMM 
estimator (see Blundell and Bond 1998, Roodman, 2009b) in line with Celasun et al. 
(2006) and Golinelli and Momigliano (2009). In addition, as is pointed out by 
Celasun and Kang (2006)  “if other regressors in the fiscal reaction function such as 
the output gap are potentially endogenous to contemporaneous primary balance 
shocks and would need to be instrumented”, then the Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimators are “the best performing estimator for 
the coefficients of the endogenous variables”. Celasun and Kang (2006) conclude 
that “tests of fiscal policy countercyclicality would preferably be based on GMM 
methods using exogenous instruments for the output gap.”
22 Following Gollinelli and 
Momigliano (2009) and Celasun et al. (2006) we are using a subset of the available 
instrument matrix, i.e., we use the t-2 to t-4 lags of the primary balance to GDP ratio, 
of the output gap and of the respective financial market variable used, and the t-3 to 
                                                 
21 Buch, Carstensen and Schertler (2010) apply the same principle in a panel VAR context where they investigate 
whether banks’ foreign assets respond to macroeconomic shocks. To this end, they use as interest rate, price and 
GDP shocks the disturbances retrieved from a three variable VAR (using interest rates, prices and GDP). Note 
that asymptotic efficiency and consistency of the standard errors of these variables comes from the orthogonality 
condition (the disturbances of the three equation VAR model are transformed into structural shocks by means of a 
Choleski decomposition).  
22 Although Arellano and Bover (1995) have shown that GMM estimators based on orthogonal deviations might 
perform better than  IV estimators in the case of dynamic panel data, there is still some debate in the literature as 
regards the properties of the two estiamtors. Specifically, Harris and Matyas (2004) have shown that GMM 
estimators might be biased when the sample size is finite.  
  20t-5 lags of the debt to GDP ratio.
23,24 The specific decision on the subset of 
instruments to be used in each case that will be presented below, takes into account 
the performance of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the absence of 
second order autocorrelation in first difference errors (i.e., that moment conditions 
are valid).
 25,26  
 
 
4. Findings  
Our starting point is a benchmark regression which includes no financial 
market variables (see Table 1, column 1). However, the findings for the lagged 
dependent variable, the lagged debt ratio and the output gap are comparable in all 
variants of the estimated model in Table 1 (see columns 1 – 13). The coefficient 
estimate of the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant, implying 
that a 1 percentage point (pp) increase in the ratio of primary balance to GDP at t-1 
will lead to a 0.8 percentage point (pp) increase in the ratio of primary balance to 
GDP at time t. This persistence in the reaction of the primary balance might reflect 
the lengthy parliamentary processes and related sunk decisions, which make the 
fiscal instrument react gradually to its target (Claeys 2006). An increase in the debt 
ratio leads to higher primary surpluses in line with the debt stabilization motive, but 
its coefficient estimate is small and not significant.
27 On the other hand, fiscal policy 
appears to be very reactive to cyclical developments. An increase in the output gap 
                                                 
23 Candelon et al. (2010) use a GMM estimator to address the lagged dependent variable problem, but instrument 
the euro area output gap with lagged values of the US output gap. 
24 The system GMM estimator is less affected by the weak instrument problem compared to the differenced 
GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991). See the discussion in Celasun and Kang (2006), Hayakawa (2007) and 
Gollineli and Momigliano (2009). Omitting the more distant lags might not lead to significant loss of information, 
see Bond (2002) and Roodman (2009a) on the implication of using too many instruments.    
25 When we specify that lagged levels of the left and right hand side variables dated t-a to t-b are used as 
instruments in the difference equation, then in the level equation we use as instruments the first difference dated 
at t-a+1 of the left and right hand side variables. For example, in the difference equation when we use as 
instruments the t-2 to t-4 lags of PBY, ygap and RAP and the t-3 to t-5 lags of Debt. In the level equation we use 
as instruments : the first lag (dated at t-1) of the first difference of PBY(t-1), RAP(t-1), ygap(t-1) and Debt(t-2). 
26In all specifications, the test on overidentifying restrictions indicates that the hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid cannot be rejected and that there is no higher-order autocorrelation.  In some of the models that will be 
presented below, wider subsets of instruments were used than the one presented above.  
27 In line with Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) we have investigated whether the level of the debt ratio matters. 
Specifically we have constructed a dummy taking value 1 if the ratio is above 60% of GDP and 0 otherwise. We 
then interact the dummy with the debt variable. Our findings indicate that high debt appears to matter more for 
fiscal balances; however, the results are still not statistically significant.  
  21by 1% leads to a close to 0.2pp increase in the ratio of primary surplus to GDP, 
pointing to a countercyclical response. This positive effect captures both the 
automatic response of fiscal policy, as well as the systematic discretionary fiscal 
policy response to the cycle. This finding is in line with those reported by Celasun et 
al. (2006) and Claeys (2006) (for the US and Japan), Bernoth et al. (2008), Forni and 
Momigliano (2004).  
[Table 1 around here] 
Turning to the financial market variables, it should be stressed that we are 
investigating how fiscal policy responds to or is affected by their changes. We 
examine two specifications, in the first case the asset price variables enter 
contemporaneously in the fiscal reaction function, while in the second case we use 
their lagged value. The coefficient estimate of the financial market variables will 
reflect whether these variables are important drivers of the primary balance. It will 
capture both the automatic and the systematic discretionary response of the fiscal 
policy maker to their changes, on top of any response to the business cycle (the 
coefficient of the output gap). Therefore, the response to the business cycle should 
not be affected to a great extent in terms of magnitude and statistical significance 
when we include in the regression each financial market variable (given that asset 
prices have been orthogonalized to output gap). Essentially, this would imply that our 
findings are not affected by multicollinearity. Findings reported in Table 1 indicate 
that there is no such problem. In addition, as noted before, we address any ommitted 
variable problem by adding time dummy variables.  
 Primary balances are affected in a positive and quite significant manner by 
asset price changes (Table 1, columns 2-11). A pick up in aggregate asset prices by 
about 1% increases the ratio of primary balances to GDP by about 0.04 percentage 
points (column 2). The lagged impact of aggregate asset price changes to primary 
balances diminishes to just above 0.01pp (column 3). Turning to the disaggregated 
asset price data, it is primarily residential property prices that exert a positive and 
quite significant contemporaneous effect on fiscal balances. A 1% increase in 
residential property prices at time t leads to close to a 0.05pp increase in the ratio of 
primary balances to GDP (column 4), whereas its lagged impact is about 0.02pp 
  22(column 5). Equity price changes have a positive and significant contemporaneous 
impact on fiscal balance, which is about 0.015pp of GDP (columns 6). Similarly, 
changes in commercial property prices have a positive and significant impact on 
primary balnces but only at time t, with their magnitude being just above 0.01pp 
(column 8). 
These findings are verified when we control simultaneously for the 
disaggregated asset price variables (see columns 10 and 11). Residential property and 
equity price changes have a positive and significant contemporanoues impact of 
fiscal balances, but it is only residential property price changes that have a significant 
lagged effect. The coefficient estimate of commercial property prices is insignificant. 
The coefficient estimate of the output gap remains positive and very significant at all 
times, with its magnitude remaining close to 0.2 as in the case with no asset price 
variable. It is worth noting, that the response to the asset price changes or the impact 
of the asset prices changes to primary balances, although relevant it is of secondary 
importance compared to that of cyclical economic developments captured by the 
output gap.  
Finally, an increase in the difference between long and short-term nominal 
interest rates (i.e., a steeper yield curve), which can also be perceived as reflecting 
future debt sustainability concerns, leads to a tigher fiscal stance, but its coefficient 
estimate is not particularly significant (see Table 1, columns 12 and 13).
28
 
4.1 Spending or revenues 
The next thing to ask is what drives these developments in fiscal balances, is it 
primarily current revenues as one might expect in case of asset price changes or is it 
also current spending? Alternatively, is it an automatic response, which should 
reflect, most likely, the current revenue channel (on top of any cyclical variation 
captured by the output gap variable), because some of the revenue components are 
affected instantaneously by asset prices changes (e.g. stamp duty and taxes related to 
property, taxes related to income from financial transactions and equity holdings 
                                                 
28 In constructing the yield curve variable we are using the difference between nominal long and short-term 
interest rates. Nominal interest rates implicitly incorporate information on expected inflation rates, in addition to 
information related to liquidity and riskiness factors of different debt instruments. 
  23etc)? Or is it a systematic discretionary response of the fiscal policy maker, which 
could include changes in current expenditure? 
 
4.1.1 Current expenditure 
To complement our analysis, and following European Commission (2006) and 
Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009), we estimate fiscal reaction functions for current 
expenditure excluding interest payments. These are formulated in essentially the 
same manner as the fiscal reaction function for the primary balance : 
       Git = b1Git-1 + b2R it-1+ b3ygapit+ b4Dit-1+ b5 Xit + b6i +yeart+uit                       (2) 
G represents expenditure, ygapit is the output gap defined as before, Dit-1 is the 
debt ratio Xit stands for financial variables, b6i captures fixed effects and yeart time 
effects, and Rit-1 represents current revenue excluding interest receipts.
 29 The lagged 
value of this last variable is included in the regression to depict that expenditure 
decisions are typically implemented taking also into account revenue developments. 
The lagged value of the expenditure variable reflects the fact that expenditure 
decisions could be persistent, or that expenditure reaches its targeted level at a 
gradual pace. The output gap variable will capture whether current expenditure is 
sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, either because of automatic responses (which are 
typically very small and usually involve unemployment benefits) or due to 
systematic discretionary responses.  
The lagged dependent variable has a positive and very significant effect. There 
is significant variability in the different specifications considered, so a 1% increase in 
the ratio of current expenditure to GDP at t-1 leads to additional spending by about 
0.5-0.98pp of GDP at time t (see Table 2, columns 1-13). There is some evidence 
that higher revenues at time t-1 lead to additional spending at time t, i.e., a 1pp 
increase in the revenue to GDP ratio at time t-1 leads to additional spending equal to 
about 0.3-0.6pp of GDP at time t (see columns 4, 8, 10 and 11). However, in most 
cases the impact effects is insignificant and at times has a negative sign. The debt 
                                                 
29 Two alternative estimation techniques have been considered, i.e. one-step difference and system GMM 
estimators following Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
estimations presented in Table 2 are those performing the best in terms of the second order residual auto-
correlation and the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.  
  24ratio does not exert any significant restraining impact on spending decisions. An 
increase in the output gap leads to a fall in current expenditure, but the coefficient 
estimates are not very significant with the exception of columns 4 and 10 (and to a 
lesser extent 3 and 6). A 1% increase in the output gap reduces current expenditure 
by about 0.2-0.4pp of GDP, this reflects both the automatic response (e.g., lower 
unemployment related spending) and any possible systematic discretionary response 
to the business cycle. Hence, spending reacts counter-cyclically, with both automatic 
and discretionary responses working in the same direction.     
After having controlled for all these factors we see that asset price changes 
have a negative, not very pronounced, but significant effect on government spending 
decisions (Table 2, columns 2-11). An increase in aggregate asset prices by 1% 
contemporaneously lowers current expenditure by about 0.056pp of GDP (column 2), 
whereas the lagged impact is slightly bigger but insignificant (column 3). Changes in 
residential property prices have the most pronounced impact on spending (by about -
0.137pp of GDP; see column 4), with the second biggest impact coming from 
changes in commercial property prices (by about -0.087pp of GDP, see column 8). 
Equity price changes exert no significant impact on spending decisions; moreover, 
the contemporaneous and lagged effects provide a mixed picture (see columns 6 and 
7).  
Controlling simultaneously for the disaggregated asset price variables (see 
columns 10 and 11), we verify the finding reported beforehand. Residential and 
commercial property price changes have a negative contemporaneous impact on 
fiscal balances, with the effect of residential property prices being the most 
pronounced. However, changes in commercial property prices have also a significant 
negative lagged effect. The coefficient of equity price changes is always 
insignificant. Looking at column 10, it is worth-noting that, although the response to 
the asset price changes or the impact of asset prices changes on current spending is 
significant and quite relevant (it is -0.139 for residential and -0.037 for commercial 
property prices), it is of secondary importance in terms of magnitude compared to 
that of cyclical economic developments captured by the output gap coefficient 
estimate (which is about -0.26).  
  25A very important finding relates to the impact of the steepening of the yield 
curve, which, among other things, can reflect concerns about debt sustainability. A 
1pp (100 basis points) increase in the differential between long and short-term 
nominal interest rates reduces spending by about 0.19-0.22pp of GDP (see Table 2, 
columns 12 and 13). To the extent that this steepening of the yield curve reflects 
bond and money market developments which are driven by market participants’ 
concerns about fiscal sustainability, then we can say that market pressure can serve 
as a significant disciplining device, and can contribute to expenditure based fiscal 
consolidation.  
[Table 2 around here] 
 
4.1.2 Current revenue 
In line with European Commission (2006) and Davig and Leeper (2009)
30 we 
estimate the following fiscal reaction function for current revenues excluding interest 
revenues: 
  Rit = c1Rit-1 + c2G it-1+ c3ygapit+ c4Dit-1+ c5 Xit + c6i +yeart+uit                    (3) 
As before revenue decisions are implemented taking also into account past 
expenditure developments; past revenue performance and decisions are relevant in 
forming current revenue decisions, whereas cyclical stabilization and debt 
sustainability are considered to be the main objectives of policy makers. 
The lagged dependent variable has a positive and very significant effect, its 
coefficient estimate reaches 0.94, highlighting the persistence inherent in revenue 
related performance and decisions (Table 3, columns 1-13).
31 Interestingly, higher 
expenditure at time t-1 generates additional revenue needs at time t, i.e., a 1pp 
increase in the current expenditure to GDP ratio at t-1 leads to additional revenue of 
0.05pp (in column 1) to 0.08pp (in column 10) of GDP at time t. Note, that this is 
practically much smaller compared to what we found in the case of the expenditure 
reaction functions (i.e., a 1pp increase in revenue at t-1 leads to additional spending 
                                                 
30 Davig and Leeper (2009) refer to lump sum taxation.  
31 Blundell et al. (2000) have shown that the moment conditions in the system GMM estimator remain 
informative as the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable approaches unity.  
  26at time t equal to about 0.3-0.6pp of GDP in the significant cases in Table 2). Hence, 
governments typically spend a bigger part of the additional revenues generated, 
compared to their ability to raise extra revenues to cover additional expences. For 
example, ceteris paribus, if revenues increase at time t-2 by 10% of GDP, then at 
time t-1 the government will spend about 4.5pp of GDP (mid point between 3-6pp of 
GDP used) out of it, but at time t it will be able to raise revenues of only 0.225-
0.585pp of GDP (i.e., 0.05-0.08 times 4.5)  to finance last year’s expenditure. This 
ratcheting up behavior can lead to deficit bias and significant debt accumulation.
32  
The debt ratio is insignificant at all times and enters with a wrong sign. 
Revenues behave procyclically, a 1% increase in the output gap raises revenues by 
about 0.07-0.08pp of GDP. This reflects the workings of both the automatic 
stabilizers and systematic discretionary responses. The coefficient of the output gap 
is always significant, contrary to the cases of current expenditure. However, it is 
worth-noting that when significant in the current expenditure case it is more sizeable, 
suggesting  a more forceful respone of expenditure to cyclical developments. 
An increase in the aggregate asset price by 1% increases current revenues 
contemporaneouly by about 0.021pp of GDP (Table 3, column 2), which is lower 
than the reduction in current expenditures (-0.056pp). This effect is driven by 
changes in residential property prices, which contemporaneously increase revenues 
by about 0.03pp of GDP (column 4), reflecting the important role of stamp duty and 
residential property taxes. It is worth noting that the contemporaneous impact of 
residential property prices on revenue is lower than on expenditure (about -0.137pp). 
Equity and commercial property prices were found to exert a significant 
contemporanous impact on current revenues of about 0.01pp (with the effect of 
commercial property prices being a bit bigger). Columns 10 and 11 that control 
simultaneously for the disaggregated asset price variables verify these findings. 
Residential property price changes have the most significant positive and sizeable 
contemporaneous impact on fiscal balances, followed by equity prices changes. On 
                                                 
32 This could be driven by the so–called  voracity effects (see, Tornel and Lane 1999) where additional (windfall) 
revenues are appropriated by powerful interest groups leading to additional spending. As Hercowitz and 
Strawczynski (2004) have shown the prolonged rise in the spending/GDP ratio is partially explained by cyclical 
upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior, i.e., the ratio increases during recessions and is only 
partially reduced in expansions, contributing to deficit bias. 
  27the contrary, commercial propery prices have no significant contemporaneous 
impact, and their lagged effect is actually negative.  
Overall, the findings for the asset price variables reflect the automatic and 
systematic discretionary responses of the policy maker, on top of his or her responses 
to indicators of cyclical economic developments, such as the output gap. The 
coefficient estimate of the output gap remains positive and significant at all times and 
its magnitude remains close to 0.07. As noted previously, the response to asset price 
changes or the impact of asset prices changes on current revenues, on average, is of 
secondary importance in terms of magnitude compared to the response to output gap. 
Interestingly, it is both current revenue and current spending responses that shape the 
primary balance response to asset price changes 
Contrary to the findings reported in the case of current expenditure the 
steepening of the yield curve (an increase in the differential between long and short-
term interest rates) does not act as a disciplining device and does not lead to higher 
revenues (see Table 3, column 12 and 13). This explains why the overall effect on 
primary balances (Table  1, columns  12 and  13) is not that significant and not as 
pronounced as the one for government expenditure. To the extent that the steepening 
of the yield curve reflects market concerns about fiscal sustainability, it might be the 
case that it also reflects market pressure on expenditure (rather than revenue) based 
fiscal consolidation, which has been shown to produce more credible and tangible 
effects (see Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, and Alesina and Ardagna 1998).  
[Table 3 around here] 
 
4.2 Stability of fiscal policy responses 
It is widely acknowledged that there has been a surge in financial development 
since the 1980s and 1990s, which implies that easier access to credit on the 
households’ side would diminish the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a 
countercyclical policy tool (see Perotti, 1999; Gali et al., 2007; Tagkalakis, 2008). In 
  28this case fiscal policy makers might become less responsive to all types of cyclical 
fluctuations.
33  
On top of that, over the course of the last 15-20 years (prior to the 2008-2009 
financial crisis), the volatility of economic cycles had fallen either due to smaller 
shocks or due to better policies.
34 For example, as we see in Table 14 (in Data 
Appendix), the average volatility of the output gap over the whole sample period is 
2.35, whereas it was 2.36 in 1970-1990 (Table 15) and diminished to 2.30 in 1991-
2005 (Table 16). This implies that discretionary and automatic responses to cyclical 
fluctuations could be more subdued, affecting also the behaviour or the response of 
fiscal balances to asset price swings and financial market changes.  
On the other hand, the experience of the current financial crisis, which was 
initiated by, and led to asset price busts (e.g., house prices in the US, UK, Ireland, 
Spain) had significant implications on fiscal balances, both through an automatic and 
a discretionary fiscal policy response. This took the form of both ad hoc measures 
and systematic responses to restore the functioning and safeguard the stability of the 
financial system. This is a very rare episode, but it could imply that fiscal policy 
makers will put more of their attention on financial market developments and might 
try to avert analogous events in future years. Moreover, although governments have 
not (prior to the current crisis) publicly announced measures or their intention to 
stabilize the financial system and asset price movements, it could be the case that 
over the course of recent years they increasingly paid more attention to financial 
market developments.  
Therefore, we need to investigate whether the potential determinants of fiscal 
policy have had any differential impact on the ratio of primary balance to GDP over 
the course of the years. To this end, we will consider two sub-samples, the first one 
being 1970-1990 and the second 1991-2005. The split date is chosen in order to have 
about the same data points in the two sub-samples given that we employ an 
                                                 
33 The stability of the results across periods has been an issue for several studies. For example, Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), Kirchner et al. (2010) report evidence of changing effects of fiscal  policy. Hence, the response to 
the fiscal policy shocks in the US and Euro area member states has become weaker in the post 1980-1990s period. 
This could be due to financial innovation and a different response to rising debt ratios. In the EU the formation of 
Economic and Monetary Union has been in itself a structural change affecting policy makers behavior.  
34 See relevant literature e.g., Cogley and Sargan (2001, 2005), Benati and Mumtaz (2007), Gali and Gambetti 
(2009), Benati and Surico (2009), on the so-called issue of  the “Great Moderation”.  
  29unbalanced panel data set. Moreover, the effects of financial liberalization and the 
development of new and complex financial instruments which are based on different 
asset classes are more visible since the 1990s.  
 
4.2.1 Primary Balance 
Comparing the findings over the two sub-samples we see that the coefficient of 
the debt ratio is positive and (at times) significant in the first sub-sample, whereas it 
is insignificant and wrongly signed in the second (see Tables 4 and 5). The lagged 
dependent variable is slightly more important in recent years (see Tables 4 and 5), 
which implies that the fiscal instrument adjusts more gradually to its target.  
The most important difference between the two sub-samples is the response of 
fiscal balances to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity as measured by the 
output gap. Fiscal policy has been countercyclical (positive coefficient on the output 
gap) over the course of the period 1970-1990 (see Table 4) and switched to becoming 
acyclical or even procyclical (negative coefficient on the output gap) in the more 
recent period 1991-2005 (see Table 5). This implies that, on average, there was no 
cyclical stabilization motive on fiscal policy makers’ responses in the latter part of 
the sample.
35 It should be kept in mind that this finding does not distinguish between 
the automatic and systematic discretionary response to cyclical fluctuations, instead 
it represents the combined effect.  
What could explain this asymmetric behaviour over the course of the years? 
Although the volatility of the output gap fell (from 2.36 to 2.30), so did its average 
value, from -0.30 in 1970-1990 to -0.87 in 1991-2005, which implies that, on 
average, economic activity moved further below trend in more recent years for the 
OECD countries examined. On the contrary, the primary balance, starting from an 
average deficit on -0.59% of GDP in 1970-1990 and an average volatility of 3.04% 
of GDP, switched to a surplus of 1.07% of GDP and an average volatility of 3.45% 
of GDP in 1991-2005. Hence, fiscal policy has become less responsive to economic 
fluctuation. Although output fell further below trend in recent years, primary 
                                                 
35 Candelon et al (2010) find a procyclical fiscal policy response in the post-Maastrich era, whereas Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2009) find evidence in favour of an acyclical response. 
  30surpluses increased. This procyclical response probably reflects a global tendency 
towards fiscal prudence (see Gali and Perotti 2003)
 36 and concerns about the long-
term sustainability of fiscal balances.
3738  
Turning now to the real asset price variables we see that fiscal policy has been 
affected by or reacted to asset price movements in both periods (column 2, Tables 4 
and 5). Looking at the disaggregated data we obtain more valuable information. The 
importance of residential property and equity prices as determinants of primary 
balances has increased over the course of the years. An 1% increase in residential 
property prices led to a close to 0.033pp increase in primary balance to GDP ratio in 
1970-1990, while more recently this increase was bigger, reaching 0.051pp of GDP. 
The same applies in the case of equity price changes, with the contemporaneous 
impact being significant and of bigger magnitude in the latter part of the sample. 
However, equity prices have a significant but smaller lagged effect in the first sub-
sample.  
We find exactly the opposite in the case of commercial property prices. In the 
first sub-sample they had a very significant impact, with their coefficient estimate 
being close to 0.03; in the second part of the sample their impact on primary balances 
and their statistical significance diminished substantially, with their lagged impact 
turning negative. When considering simultaneously all asset price changes (Column 
10, Tables 4 and 5), it is commercial property prices that matter most (they have a 
positive effect) in the first period, and residential property and equity prices in the 
second part of the sample. Commercial property prices have negative 
contemporaneous and lagged effects on primary balances in the second part of the 
sample.  
What could be behind this response? Examining the summary statistics of the 
(corrected) disaggregated asset price series, one can see that, while their volatility has 
remained the same or slightly decreased, their average value has changed 
                                                 
36 The effects of the creation of the EMU and the nessecity to abide by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 for the Euro area member states are picked up by the time dummy variables.    
37 However, this tendency to fiscal prudence is driven mainly by revenue developments, with the average value of 
current revenue excluding interest receipts increasing from 38.9% of GDP in 1970-1990 to 42.9% of GDP in 
1991-2005, whereas current spending excluding interest payments on average increased from 37.1% to 40.5% of 
GDP in the second sub-sample. 
38 Nevertheless, fiscal policy has been found less responsive to rising outstanding debt ratios, whose average 
value increased from 49.7% of GDP in the first sub-sample to 68.3% of GDP in the second sub-sample 
  31substantially.
39 The average value of the change in real equity prices increased from -
0.44% in the first sub-sample to 0.48% in the second sub-sample, and that for 
residential property prices increased from -0.92% to 0.98%. On the contrary, the 
average value of real commercial property prices fell substantially over the course of 
the years, reaching -1.81% in 1991-2005 from 2.08% in 1970-2005.
40 41 Hence, in the 
first part of the sample developments in real estate and equity markets contributed to 
increasing primary balances. An asset price boom was perceived as signaling good 
economic times and improved fiscal balances either automatically or by means of 
discretionary action. In the second sub-sample, developments in residential property 
and equity markets had a positive effect on primary balances, whereas developments 
in commercial property markets have had a negative impact on primary balances. 
The fact that residential property and equity price changes were on average positive 
contributed to improving fiscal balances both automatically and possibly by means of 
additional discretionary actions (if developments in these markets signaled good 
economic times). However, this does not appear to be the case for commercial 
property prices. 
 One important difference between the two subsamples relates to the behavior 
of the differential between long and short-term nominal interest rates (see Tables 4 
and 5,  columns 12 and 13). Its coefficient has switched sign, i.e., from negative in 
the first period to positive in the second period, and has increased in terms of 
statistical significance, though in absolute terms it is still insignificant. This implies 
that over the course of the years the steepening of the slope of the yield curve has 
                                                 
39 The standard deviation of the changes of real residential, commercial property and equity prices has fallen from 
7.1%, 12.6% and 20.9% in 1970-1990, to 5%, 9,2% and 17.3% in 1991-2005, respectively. However, the GDP 
deflator based inflation rate was more than halfed in the same period (though starting from a much smaller value), 
i.e., from 4.7% it diminished to 2.0% in the latter sub-sample.   
40 As a comparison it should be noted that the average value of the GDP deflator based inflation rate fell 
dramatically over the course of the years, reaching 2.2% in 1991-2005 from 8.2% in 1970-1990. This could be 
linked to smaller shocks (e.g., less volatile economic activity) and to better policies, i.e., the improved ability of 
monetary policy makers to rein inflation, enhanced also by the improved institutional framework in which they 
operate (i.e. the establishment of independent central banks). See reference in footnote 22.  
41This is also the case when we consider the actual asset price series, i.e. their volatility remains the same or 
decreases slightly, and the mean values of equity and residentical property prices changes are always positive but 
increase in the second part of the sample, whereas the one for commercial property prices decreases and turns 
negative.  
  32played an increasing role in disciplining fiscal policy making and raising primary 
balances.
42




The lagged dependent variable has a sizeable impact throughout the sample 
period. The lagged value of revenue to GDP ratio has a positive and significant effect 
on government spending in the first sub-sample, in the second part of the sample it is 
insignificant and its coefficient estimate switches sign (see Tables 6 and 7). It 
appears that in the earlier years governments used to spend a certain fraction of the 
extra revenues generated in previous periods; however, this attitude appears to have 
changed in the latter part of the sample. A 1% increase in the debt ratio at time t-1 
reduces government spending at time t (in a quite significant manner) by about 
0.01pp in the first part of the sample. On the contrary, in the period 1991-2005 the 
coefficient of the debt ratio has changed sign, being positive and at highly 
insignificant.  
Current expenditure is particularly responsive to cyclical fluctuations in 
economic activity in the period 1970-1990, with the coefficient of the output gap 
being about -0.12 (Table 6). In the second part of the sample expenditure still shows 
a countercyclical response, but the coefficient estimate of the output gap is 
insignificant (only in columns 12 and 13 it is on the borderline of significance; see 
Table 7). 
The aggregate asset price index has no significant effect on expenditure. 
Residential property price changes exert a negative effect on expenditure in the 
second part of the sample (-0.2pp of GDP). Equity price changes have a significant 
                                                 
42 This also relates to the fact that in the first sub-sample the long-short-term nominal interest rate differential was 
on average marginally negative, i.e., -4 basis points (-0.04pp), whereas it turned positive and increased 
substantially to about 100 basis points (1pp) in the second part of the sample, in line also with the pick up in 
average debt ratio to 68.3% from 49.7% of GDP in the first sub-sample. Nevertheless, as one can see in Tables 
18-21 both short and long-term interest rates fall in the second part of the sample, with the fall in short term rates 
was of bigger magnitude contributing to the widening of the long–short interest rate differential.  
43 Two alternative estimation techniques have been considered, i.e. one-step difference and system GMM 
estimators following Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
estimations presented in Tables 6-7 are those performing the best in terms of the second order residual auto-
correlation and the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.  
  33negative lagged effect on primary spending in the first period. Changes in 
commercial property prices have a pronounced negative and significant effect on 
government spending, but only in the first sub-sample.  
This is in line with the fact that the average value of the changes in residential 
property prices increased in 1991-2005, whereas the average value of the change in 
commercial property prices decreased in the same period.  Government spending 
reacted more forcefully and counter cyclically in the latter part of the sample to rising 
residential property prices, while in the first part of the sample spending was cut after 
a pick up in commercial property prices (and to a lesser extent to equity prices) 
implying that these asset price changes must have been perceived as signalling good 
economic times. 
In line with the findings across the whole period, we see that the impact of the 
steepening of the yield curve induces more prudent fiscal behaviour in particular in 
1991-2005 (see Tables 6 and 7 and columns 12 and 13). Specifically, a 1pp increase 
in the differential between long and short-term nominal interest rates (at time t) 
reduces spending by about 0.58pp of GDP at time t (the lagged impact is 0.49pp of 
GDP). The magnitude of the response is quite sizeable reflecting the importance of 
market pressures and concerns related the long-term sustainability of public 
finances.
44  
[Tables 6 and 7 around here] 
 
4.2.3 Current revenue 
In both sub-samples past revenue performance affects substantially current 
revenues, the debt ratio has no particular impact on revenues, while an increase in 
last years expenditure generates additional revenue needs in the current year (see 
Tables 8-9). Current revenues behave procyclically in the period 1970-1990;  taken 
together with the strong countercyclical expenditure over the same period, this 
explains why fiscal policy was countercyclical in the first part of the sample. By 
contrast, during 1991-2005 revenues are not particularly responsive to cyclical 
                                                 
44 At odds with what one would expect the debt ratio has a positive effect on government spending, but its size is 
very small compared to the effect on the differential between long and short term interest rates.   
  34fluctuations, which explains the overall acyclical or procyclical behavior of fiscal 
balances in the second part of the sample.  
In the first sub-sample, all asset price changes have a strong significant 
contemporanous impact on current revenues. This refers in particular to residential 
and commercial property prices (Table 8). Changes in residential property prices also 
have a significant lagged impact on government revenues. On the contrary, in the 
second part of the sample it is mostly an increase in residential property prices (and 
to a lesser extent in equity prices) that have a stong positive and sizable 
contemporaneous effect on current revenues (see Table 9). Interestingly, changes in 
commercial property prices have a quite significant negative lagged effect on current 
revenues (see Table 9). Overall, these findings verify the increasing role and impact 
of the changes in residential property prices on current revenues in recent years, in 
line also with their increasing average value in 1991-2005.  
Following an increase in residential property prices, fiscal balances improve in 
the second part of the sample mostly because of higher tax revenues and lower 
spending. An increase in equity prices leads to higher revenues (but the effect is not 
very significant), while spending is unresponsive, improving primary balances. 
Following an increase in commercial property prices, revenues fall (while spending 
is irresponsive) reducing primary balances. In the period 1970-1990 a pick up in 
residential, commercial property and equity prices raises revenues and improves 
primary balances. Spending cuts following contemporanous increases in commercial 
property prices contribute to the improvement of primary balances, but they are of 
secondary importance.  
Finally, and in contrast to the findings reported in the case of current 
expenditure, an increase in the differential between long and short-term nominal 
interest rates has no significant impact on current revenues (see Tables 8 and 9). This 
explains why the overall effect on primary balances from the steepening of the yield 
curve is much more subdued compared to that for government expenditure. 
[Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
 
  354.3 So what is the overall picture? 
The main findings are that primary balances respond countercyclically over the 
cycle, reflecting a procyclical current revenue and counter cyclical current spending 
behaviour. This response incorporates both the automatic and systematic 
discretionary response of the fiscal policy maker.  
Trying to account for the effect that financial innovation and development had 
on fiscal policy response, we considered two subsamples, 1970-1990 and 1991-2005. 
Fiscal policy has been countercyclical over the course of the period 1970-1990 and 
switched to becoming acyclical or even procyclical (negative coefficient on the 
output gap) in 1991-2005. Current revenues behaved procyclically in the period 
1970-1990; taken together with the countercyclical expenditure response over the 
same period explains why fiscal policy was countercyclical in the first part of the 
sample. By constrast, in 1991-2005 revenues are not particularly responsive to 
cyclical fluctuations, which explains the overall acyclical or procyclical behavior of 
fiscal balances in the second part of the sample.  
Hence, there was no cyclical stabilization motive on fiscal policy makers’ 
responses in the latter part of the sample. The automatic and the discretionary 
responses worked in the same direction in the first part of the sample, whereas in the 
second part they have worked in opposite directions. Therefore, a fall in the output 
gap variable generated a negative automatic response in fiscal balances which was 
countered by a positive discretionary response. This procyclical response probably 
reflects a global tendency towards fiscal prudence and concerns about the long-term 
sustainability of fiscal balances. 
Increased debt levels contribute to reducing fiscal balances and restraining 
spending decisions. However, this debt stabilizing motive was prevalent only in the 
first part of the sample.  
Interestingly, current spending and revenue reaction functions have shown that 
there is an inherent deficit bias in the response of fiscal policy makers, i.e., ceteris 
paribus, governments typically spend a bigger part of the additional revenues 
generated, compared to their ability to raise extra revenues to cover additional 
  36expences. Nevertheless, it appears that, on average, in the period 1991-2005 this 
tendency ceased.  
There is evidence that an increase in asset prices affects primary balances in a 
positive and significant manner. The overall primary balance response reflects an 
increase in government revenues and negative response of government spending. The 
most important impact on fiscal balances is due to changes in residential property 
prices. Equity price changes and commercial property price changes were also found 
to be important determinants of fiscal balances. The importance of residential 
property and equity prices as determinant of primary balances has increased over the 
course of the years, whereas the importance of commercial property prices has 
diminished.  
Following an increase in residential property prices, fiscal balances improve in 
the second part of the sample mostly because of higher tax revenues and lower 
spending. An increase in equity prices leads to higher revenues (but the effect is not 
very significant), while spending is irresponsive, improving primary balances. 
Following an increase in commercial property prices, revenues fall (while spending 
is irresponsive). In the period 1970-1990 a pick up in residential, commercial 
property and equity prices leads to higher revenues and improves primary balances. 
Spending cuts following a pick up in commercial property prices improve primary 
balances.  
Overall, it is worth noting that the impact of asset price changes to fiscal 
balances is of secondary importance compared to the response of fiscal balances 
(including current spending and current revenue) to cyclical economic conditions as 
captured by the output gap.  
The steepening of the yield curve contributes to fiscal discipline and improves 
fiscal balances by inducing expenditure cuts, which could possibly reflect market 
pressures to pursue an expenditure based fiscal consolidation. The impact of the 
steepening of the yield curve induces more prudent fiscal behavior (restraining 
spending decisions) in particular in 1991-2005. The magnitude of the response is 
quite sizeable reflecting the importance of market pressures and concerns related to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances 
  375. Robustness check 
5.1 Cyclically adjusted primary balances 
As a robustness test we investigate whether financial market developments 
have a different effect on the cyclically adjusted primary balances, which are 
supposed to better reflect discretionary fiscal policy responses (see Table  10). 
Starting from the control variables we see that, as in the case of unadjusted primary 
balances, the lagged dependent variable has a very significant and sizeable impact. 
The debt ratio has a very significant positive effect on cyclically adjusted primary 
balances, with its magnitude being twice as large compared to the findings in Table 
1. Therefore, debt stabilization is a very powerful motive for policy makers.  
By constrast, the discretionary response of fiscal policy makers to cyclical 
economic conditions is not so pronounced. The coefficient on the output gap is 
smaller and not as significant as in Table 1. Hence, the biggest part of the response of 
primary balances to output gap movements (about 0.2pp of GDP; see Table 1) 
reflects the automatic response to the cycle, whereas, as we see in Table 10, the 
discretionary response is much smaller, i.e., around 0.04pp of GDP (but one need to 
be cautious here because the results are not statistically significant).  
Turning to asset prices, changes in residential property prices, and to a lesser 
extent equity prices, exert a very significant and positive effect on cyclically adjusted 
primary balances (Table 10). A 1% increase in residential property prices increases 
cyclically adjusted primary balances by about 0.053-0.055pp of GDP, while the 
effect on primary balances was just a bit less than 0.05pp of GDP (Table 1). A 1% 
increase in equity prices increases cyclically adjusted primary balances by about 
0.010-0.13pp of GDP, whereas the impact on primary balances was about 0.013-
0.015pp of GDP (Table 1). Compared to the primary balance case, changes in 
commercial property prices have a smaller (positive) and insignificant effect on 
cyclically adjusted primary balances. The differential between long and short-term 
nominal interest rates has no particular impact on the cyclically adjusted fiscal 
stance.   
Overall, asset price changes affect positively and significantly both cyclically 
adjusted and unadjusted primary balances. This implies that policy makers should 
  38take asset price movements into account because they can provide additional 
information on cyclical economic conditions. 
[Table 10 around here] 
 
5.2 Stability of responses across sub-samples 
As we have seen before, fiscal policy making has changed over the course of 
the years in terms of its responsiveness to cyclical conditions and debt developments 
on account of several factors, including e.g., financial development. Next, we 
investigate whether this has any effect on the conduct of discretionary fiscal policy 
making. Comparing the findings in Tables 11 and 12 we see that, as in the primary 
balance case, the persistence of the lagged dependent variable has increased 
significantly in recent years. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
increased from about 0.82 (in 1970-1990) to about 0.93 (in 1991-2005). The debt 
stabilization motive is prevalent and most pronounced in the first part of the sample, 
but is abscent in the second sub-sample (as in the primary balance case).  
Fiscal policy responds in a countercyclical manner (positive coefficient) in the 
first sub-sample, whereas it is highly procyclical in the latter part. Given that, on 
average, output fell further below trend in 1991-2005 (the average value of the output 
gap is negative) and that the average value (and the standard deviation) of the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance increased from  -0.81% of GDP ( 2.73% of GDP)  
in 1970-1990 to 0.93% of GDP (to 3.26% of GDP) in 1991-2005, we can say that 
fiscal policy was conducted in a procyclical manner in worse economic conditions. 
This implies that the cyclical stabilization of the economy was not the primary 
objective of  fiscal policy makers. Instead, as Perotti and Gali (2003) point out in 
more recent years there was a global trend towards a more prudent fiscal stance. For 
example in the EU this was related to the run up to European Monetary Union and 
the need to abide by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. On the other hand, 
increased concerns about the long-term sustainability of public finances linked also 
  39to the future costs of population ageing could have induced discipline on fiscal policy 
makers.
45  
A 1% increase in residential property prices increases cyclically adjusted 
primary balances by about 0.06p of GDP in 1970-1990 ; the corresponding effect is 
much less pronounced and not significant in the latter part of the sample, which is 
exactly the opposite of what we found in the case of primary balances. This could 
imply that in 1991-2005 the effect of residential property prices on fiscal balances 
reflects primarily an automatic response rather than a discretionary action. 
Cyclically adjusted balances respond more forcefully to equity price changes in 
the second sub-sample, i.e., increase by about 0.014pp of GDP. In the first part of the 
sample their effect is smaller and insignificant. This is exactly the same pattern of 
responses we get in the case of primary balances. However, the increase in primary 
balances is twice as large in 1991-2005, i.e., about 0.025pp of GDP, implying that, in 
the second sub-sample, there is both an automatic and a discetionary response to 
increasing equity prices. Possibly because asset price changes are perceived as 
reflecting improvements in cyclical economic conditions.  
A change in commercial property prices generates quite different responses in 
the two sub-samples, cyclically adjusted primary balances increase in the first and 
fall in the second part of the sample. A similar pattern of responses is obtained in the 
case of unadjusted primary balances, indicating that a pick up in commercial asset 
prices leads to significant automatic and discretionary increases in primary balances, 
in the first part of the sample (where on average its mean value was positive, 
indicating improving economic conditions). Overall, asset prices are important 
drivers of both cyclically adjusted and unadjusted fiscal balances. 
The differential between long and short-term nominal interest rates does not 
have a significant impact on the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance. Nevertheless, as in 
the primary balance case, its coefficient is negative in the first part and turns positive 
in the second part of the sample. 
[Tables 11 and 12 around here]  
                                                 
45 However, the outstanding debt ratio is highly insignificant. 
 
  405.3. Robustness across sub-samples 
Given that tax structures differ between countries in this section we want to 
establish robustness of our results across subsamples. As reported in Appendix 1, 
based on information provided by Johansson et al (2008), the share of property taxes 
[they include recurrent taxes on immovable property (paid by both households and 
businesses), taxes on net wealth (paid by both households and corporations), taxes on 
gifts and inheritance and taxes on financial and capital transactions] as a percentage 
of GDP has remained approximately constant, on average, at around 1.7-1.8% in the 
period 1975-2005 in the OECD. However, there are some difference, i.e., in France, 
Ireland, Korea, Luxembourg and Spain this share has increased by more than 2.5 
percentage points since 1980, whereas in New Zealand it decreased more than 3 
percentage points. Moreover, although property taxes have a low revenue share, they 
do remain an important source of revenue in some OECD countries, with the United 
Kingdom, Korea, the United States and Canada obtaining at least 10% of tax revenue 
from this source in 2005 (Johansson et al., 2008).  Moreover, as a percentage of 
GDP, the recurrent taxes on immovable property have increased by 0.5 percentage 
points or more only in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden and decreased by 
more than 0.5 percentage points in the United Kingdom. The taxes on financial and 
capital transactions, in percent of GDP, have increased by more than 0.4 percentage 
points in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom 
while they decreased by more than 0.4  percentage points only in Japan. 
In order to establish robustness across sub-samples we focus our attention on 
the most important cases. We restimate our baseline regression on primary balances 
(Table 1), the current revenue specification (Table 3) and the cyclically adjusted 
primary balances specification (Table 10) by excluding, in turn, one of the following 
countries Australia, Canada, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and United States.  
The cases to exclude were decided on the following grounds, i.e., countries 
where property taxation constitutes a significant part of tax revenues (US, UK, 
Canada) or countries whose immovable property or financial and capital transactions 
taxes have increased over time (France, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands). The 
  41consideration of Ireland, Spain, the UK and the US was also driven by these 
countries’ recent experience (the house price bust at the onset of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis). Furthermore, we excluded countries that were hit by banking and 
financial crisis (which required public intervention) as defined by Laevan and 
Valencia (2008). The cases included in our sample were the following: Australia in 
1989-1992, Finland in 1991-1994, France in 1994-1995, Japan in 1992-2005, 
Sweden in 1991-1994, the US in 1981-1991 and 1998, and Norway in 1987.  
The results reported in Tables 13-15 indicate that our model is robust to the 
exclusion of each of these countries. Our findings are neither driven by differences in 
the tax structure of these countries nor by financial and real estate market 
developments (and related public interventions) in specific countries. 
[Tables 13, 14 and 15 around here] 
 
 
6. Summary of results and conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the links between financial market 
movements and fiscal policy outcomes. We have examined the impact of changes in 
aggregate asset prices, residential, commercial propery and equity prices, as well as 
the effect of the difference between long and short-term nominal interest rates on 
fiscal balances.  The objective was to improve our understanding about whether 
financial market movements have had any effect on the conduct of fiscal policy 
making, and whether previous evidence suggests that asset price changes should be 
taken into account.  
In order to do that we have estimated standard fiscal policy reaction functions, 
as in Gali and Perotti (2003), Celasun et al. (2006) and Gollinelli and Momigliano 
(2009), augmented with financial market variables. Our primary focus has been on 
primary balances, current expenditure excluding interest payments and current 
revenues excluding interest receipts. As a robustness test we also investigated 
cyclically adjusted primary balances, which better reflect the discretionary response 
of the fiscal policy maker. Following other studies that have found a changing effect 
  42of fiscal policy over the years (either due to financial innovation and development or 
due to rising debt ratios) we split the sample into two subperiods: 1970-1990 and 
1991-2005 in order to examine if fiscal policy makers have responded differently 
over the years. 
The main findings are that primary balances respond countercyclically over the 
cycle, reflecting a procyclical current revenue and counter cyclical current spending 
behaviour. This response incorporates both the automatic and systematic 
discretionary response of the fiscal policy maker. However, the discretionary 
response of fiscal policy makers (cyclically adjusted primary balances) to cyclical 
economic conditions is not so pronounced. Fiscal policy has been counter-cyclical 
over the course of the period 1970-1990 and switched to becoming acyclical or even 
procyclical in the more recent period 1991-2005. This finding is even more 
pronounced when considering the cyclically adjusted primary balances.  
The automatic and the discretionary fiscal policy responses worked in the same 
direction in the first part of the sample, whereas in the latter part they worked in 
opposite directions. Therefore, in the period 1991-2005, a fall in the output gap 
variable generated a negative automatic response in fiscal balances which was 
countered by a positive discretionary response, i.e., fiscal policy was conducted in a 
procyclical manner in worse economic conditions. This procyclical response possibly 
reflects a global tendency towards fiscal prudence. 
Increased debt levels contribute to reducing fiscal balances (by restraining 
spending decisions) in particular when considering cyclically adjusted primary 
balances. The debt stabilization motive is prevalent and most pronounced in the first 
part of the sample, but is absent in the second sub-sample. 
Turning to the financial variables, the steepening of the slope of the yield curve 
contributes to fiscal discipline, in particular in recent years. It improves fiscal 
balances by inducing expenditure cuts, which could possibly reflect market pressures 
to pursue expenditure based fiscal consolidation. 
There is evidence that an increase in asset prices affects primary balances in a 
positive and significant manner. The increase in primary balance is driven by an 
increase in government revenues and a cut back in spending.. The most important 
  43impact on fiscal balances is due to changes in residential property prices. Equity 
price changes and commercial propery price changes affect fiscal balances, but they 
are of secondary importance.  
Residential property and equity prices are more important determinants of 
primary balances over the course of the years, whereas the importance of commercial 
property prices has diminished. These findings verify the increasing impact of   
residential property prices changes on current revenues and spending over the years. 
Nevertheless, in more recent years, the effect of residential property prices reflects 
primarily an automatic rather than a discretionary response of cyclically adjusted 
fiscal balances. In the case of equity prices, there is both an automatic and 
discetionary response.  
Overall, we see that asset prices have a significant (although not particularly 
sizeable) effect on both cyclically adjusted and unadjusted fiscal balances (see Tables 
16 and 17). This implies that, following an increase in asset prices, there is 
significant positive automatic response of fiscal balances and, at times, a significant 
discretionary response (in particular, as regards government spending changes). The 
latter could imply that asset price movements are relevant indicators of cyclical 
economic conditions and provide valuable information, on top of what is reflected in 
output gap movements. In this case, policy makers could, for example, start building 
up fiscal buffers for the rainy days to come.  
Alternatively, it might be the case that fiscal policy makers do not react in a 
discretionary manner to asset price changes (in particular, as regards government 
revenue changes). This means that the impact that asset price variables have on 
cyclically adjusted primary balances merely reflects the fact that the fiscal stance is 
contaminated by asset price effects, which means that the policy maker does not have 
a full grasp of his/her decision or policy variable (i.e., the cyclically adjusted fiscal 
stance).
46 Consequently, this will affect his/her decisions and his/her  ability to 
                                                 
46 As stated beforehand governments and international institutions like the IMF, the OECD and the European 
Commission  (see e.g. OECD, 2008; European Commission, 2009; IMF, 2010) assess fiscal policy developments 
and conduct fiscal policy surveillance by focusing on the cyclically adjusted primary balances, i.e., they only net 
out the impact of output gap movements (at times, they take into account the effect of other one-off factors), 
without controlling for the automatic impact of asset price changes that mainly comes from the revenue side. 
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address debt sustainability issues.  
Therefore policy makers should take on board financial market developments 
(like the steepening of the yield curve) because they might reflect market concerns 
regarding the sustainability of a country’s fiscal position. Furthermore, asset price 
movements are relevant for three reasons. First, asset price changes should be 
controlled for in order for the policy maker to have a better grasp of the actual 
cyclically adjusted fiscal stance.
47 Second, they are relevant because asset price 
movements could carry information on cyclical economic conditions, on top of the 
information provided by economic activity variables. For example, asset prices might 
be booming, whereas the output gap might be pointing to output being still below 
trend. Third, they are relevant because asset price changes, in particular abrupt asset 
price movements, could provide information on forthcoming low probability events, 
such as financial instability and widespread financial crisis. The current crisis is the 
best example, the collapse in the US housing market that started in  the second 
semester of 2007 spread to the US banking and financial system, leading, in 
particular after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008, to worldwide 
financial crisis, instability and economic recession.  These reasons point to the need 
for the fiscal policy makers to act pro-actively and build up fiscal buffers when 
economic conditions are good and when asset prices are booming. These fiscal 
buffers should be built primarily by the automatic improvement in fiscal balances 
(revenues), without, however, excluding additional discretionary action. 
[Tables 16 and 17 around here] 
                                                 
47 And in order to improve fiscal policy analysis and surveillance by international economic insitututions.  
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  50Appendix 1 Property and personal capital income taxes in OECD 
countries  
This section draws heavily on information provided by two OECD studies, 
Johansson et al (2008) and Andre (2010), and summarizes the main features of 
property and personal capital income taxes in OECD countries.
 48 This information is 
relevant because property and personal capital income taxes are affected by asset 
price movements (financial and real estate variables).  
As documented by Johansson et al. (2008) on average in the OECD the share 
of property taxes [they include recurrent taxes on immovable property (paid by both 
households and businesses), taxes on net wealth (paid by both households and 
corporations), taxes on gifts and inheritance and taxes on financial and capital 
transactions] as a percentage of GDP has remained approximately constant at around 
1.7-1.8% in the period 1975-2005. However, there are some differences, i.e., in 
France, Ireland, Korea, Luxembourg and Spain the share has increased by more than 
2.5 percentage points since 1980, whereas in New Zealand it decreased more than 3 
percentage points. Moreover, although property taxes have a low revenue share, they 
do remain an important source of revenue in some OECD countries, with the United 
Kingdom, Korea, the United States and Canada obtaining at least 10% of tax revenue 
from this source in 2005 (Johansson et al., 2008).   
OECD averages indicate that recurrent taxes on immovable property – mainly 
levied at the sub-national level - account for approximately half of total property 
taxes (about 0.9% of GDP), while taxes on financial and capital transactions account 
for about half of the rest (about 0.4% of GDP). Recurrent taxes on net wealth are on 
average a bit more than 0.2% of GDP, whereas estate, inheritance and gift taxes are 
about 0.1% of GDP. As reported in Johansson et al (2008) there are no strong trends 
in the revenues from any of these taxes as a share of GDP despite short-term 
variations) As a percentage of GDP, the recurrent taxes on immovable property have 
increased by 0.5 percentage points or more only in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden and decreased by more than 0.5 percentage points in the United Kingdom. 
The taxes on financial and capital transactions, in percent of GDP, have increased by 
                                                 
48 More detailed information on OECD tax structure can be find in Johanson et al (2008), whereas more detailed 
information on the links between tax system and housing prices can be find in Andre (2010), ECB (2009), 
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004), and Wolswijk (2010).  
  51more than 0.4 percentage points in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain 
and the United Kingdom while they decreased by more than 0.4  percentage points 
only in Japan. 
A variety of taxes, tax reliefs and subsidies affect the housing sector. These 
fiscal provisions vary greatly across countries, but generally result in a system which 
is far from neutral, i.e., there is often a bias in favour of homeownership, which is 
widely assumed to bring positive externalities (see Andre, 2010).
49 Imputed rental 
income is not taxed under income tax (except in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden), however most countries impose property taxes which have a similar 
effect (Johansson et al. 2008; ECB, 2009). At the same time, mortgage interest 
payments can be deducted from the personal income tax base in many countries, but 
not in Canada, Germany, France (they became partly deductible in 2007) and the 
United Kingdom (tax reliefs on mortgages were abolished in 2000 in the UK). 
However, some countries, like Belgium and Spain, even allow for a deduction of the 
principal repayments. 
Realised capital gains on owner-occupied houses are often not subject to 
capital gains tax, though the value of the house is subject to inheritance tax in most 
countries, except Canada and Sweden. Moreover, some countries levy a high 
transaction tax on the purchase of houses. This refers to stamp duties, transfer and 
cadastral taxes, VAT taxes which are are levied on housing transactions. These taxes 
vary widely across countries and usually account for a large share of the acquisition 
costs. In Ireland, stamp duties have been used to restrain housing demand, with 
mixed results (OECD, 2006).
50
Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have 
introduced a dual tax system which taxes personal capital income at a low and 
proportional rate while labour income continues to be taxed at high and progressive 
                                                 
49 According to Andre (2010) it is questionable whether tax advantages granted to homeowners are effective at 
achieving their social objectives, i.e., ensuring access to housing at a reasonable cost. “As tax advantages increase 
demand for housing, they tend to increase the level of house prices, offsetting part of the tax advantage. 
Moreover, housing-related tax advantages are usually regressive in terms of redistribution and costly for the 
government budget.” Furthermore, advantageous tax treatment of housing may also lead to over-investment in 
real estate and misallocation of capital, with negative effects on long-term economic growth (see Andre, 2010; 
ECB, 2009; Hoeller and Rae, 2007). 
50 And in the present crisis, a number of countries have used tax measures to bolster house prices: Ireland, for 
example, removed stamp duty on first-time buyers (of relatively inexpensive properties) and extended mortgage 
interest relief (IMF, 2009a). 
 
  52rates. In practice, a majority of OECD countries may be characterized as having 
‘semi-dual’ income tax systems, which are defined as tax systems that use different 
nominal tax rates on different types of income, typically by taxing some forms of 
capital income at low and often flat rates and remaining forms of income at higher 
and progressive rates (e.g., Netherlands introduced such a system in 2001).  
The rate of taxation on dividends combines features of both the personal and 
corporate tax systems. Many European countries have moved away from full 
imputation systems to systems where dividends are taxed at a lower rate at the 
personal level. Germany introduced the so-called half-income system in 2002, 
whereby 50% of dividends are taxed as personal income (but it was abolished as part 
of the 2008 tax reform). Several other countries have introduced or are introducing 
similar partial inclusion systems where some proportion of dividends are taxed as 
personal income, e.g., Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Turkey.  On average, the 
top marginal tax rate on dividends in OECD countries was reduced by more than 7 
percentage points between 2000 and 2007 to 43%. The largest part of this reduction 
is attributable to the reduction in the corporate income tax rate.
51 Since 2000, the top 
marginal tax rate on dividends has increased only in Finland and Norway (as a result 
of the introduction of the partial inclusion system in Finland and the allowance for 
shareholder equity tax system in Norway) and in Korea. 
                                                 
51 The part of the tax that is paid as corporate income tax has decreased by more than 5 percentage points to 
27.6% on average in the OECD. A smaller part of the reduction in the statutory tax burden on dividends is due to 
the decrease in personal income tax rates.The reduction of the effective tax rate was 10.8 percentage points in the 
United States, due to the recent introduction of a reduced tax rate on dividends at the personal level. 
 
  53Appendix 2 Data information   
We used an annual unbalanced panel data set (1970-2005) of 17 OECD 
economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, 
and United States.  
 
Macroeconomic variables 
The macroeconomic variables used extend from 1970 to 2005.  Fiscal and 
output variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook (2008), the definitions used 
are: primary balance as a percent of GDP (PBY), cyclically adjusted primary balance 
as a percent of GDP (CAPBY), debt ratio as a percent of GDP (Debt), current 
expenditure excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP (CDXY), current 
revenue excluding interest receipts as a percent of GDP (CRXY), output gap (ygap), 
short-term nominal interest rate, long-term nominal interest rate, the GDP deflator. 
The difference between the long and short nominal interest rates is used as a proxy 
for the slope of the yield curve. The inflation rate is the GDP deflator based inflation 
rate (i.e. the growth rate of the GDP deflator times 100).   
 
Asset price variables 
Our asset price indicators were kindly provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), and have been used in earlier studies, like Borio and Lowe (2002). 
The main indicator is the growth rate (times 100) of the annual aggregate real asset 
prices (AP), which covers 1970-2005 for 17 industrial countries and combines price 
indices for three asset classes - equities, residential property and commercial property 
– by weighting the components using shares of the asset classes in private sector 
wealth. The private consumption deflator is used to convert nominal to real asset 
prices. In addition, we considered also the growth rates (times 100 in each case) of 
the three disaggregate asset price indicator, i.e., real commercial prices (CP), real 
residential prices (RP) and real equity prices (EP). As discussed in Section 3.3, we 
then net the effect of the economic cycle, by regressing each asset price variable on 
the contemporaneous and first and second lagged values of the output gap. The 
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residuals from these regressions are then used in the empirical analysis. These are 
called RAP, RRP, REP, and RCP.  
Table 18 presents the correlations between the output gap and the asset prices 
variables, as well as the correlations between the asset price variables. Table 19 
reports summary statistics and Tables 20 and 21 present summary statistics for the 
two sample periods considered in the main text. Appendix 3 Tables 
Table 1 Primary balance and asset price variables 
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Commercia
l property 
p r i c e s   ( t - 1 )               
0.0029   
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0.0614 












a 0.187                          0.118 0.139 0.084 0.103 0.069 0.119 0.121 0.095 0.993 0.985 0.231 0.225
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Notes: Dependent variable: Primary balance as a percent of GDP (PBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009b). Year dummy 
variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
a Not robust, but not weakened 
by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a) . 
b When we specify that lagged levels of the left and right hand side variables dated t-a to t-b are used as instruments in the difference 
equation, then in the level equation we use as instruments the first difference dated at t-a+1 of the left and right hand side variables. For example, when we use in the difference 
equation as instruments  the t-2 to t-4 lags of primary balance, output gap and asset prices and the t-3 to t-5 lags of debt, in the level equation we use as instruments: the first lag 
(dated at t-1) of the first difference of primary balaance(t-1), asset prices(t-1), output gap(t-1) and debt(t-2). 
  57 
Table 2 Current expenditure excluding interest payments as a % of GDP 
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Yield curve 
s l o p e                   (-2.05)**
-0.221284 
Yield curve 
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Notes: Dependent variables: Current expenditure excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step difference GMM, see Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Roodman (2009b). Collumns 12-13: One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable 
bias.*,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
a Not robust, but it cannot be  weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 
2009a). 
bA collapsed instrument set was used according to Roodman (2009b). 
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0.0512    
(2.72) 
*** 
0.0691    
(3.72) 
*** 
0.0579    
(3.06) 
*** 
0.0635     
(3.44) 
*** 
0.0546    
(2.91) 
*** 
0.0779    
(3.99) 
*** 
0.0577    
(2.92) 
*** 
0.0843    
(4.36) 
*** 
0.0606     
(3.03) 
*** 
0.0594    
(3.23) 
*** 
0.0616    
(3.31) 
*** 
Debt (t-1)  -0.0016 
(-0.99)    
-0.0009 
(-0.56)    
-0.0015 
(-0.92)    
-0.0009 
(-0.58)     
-0.0013 
(-0.77)    
-0.0012  
(-0.73)    
-0.0014 




(-0.77)    
-0.0008 
(-0.52)     
-0.00101 
   (-0.64)   
-0.0014 
(-0.85)    
-0.0013 
(-0.78)    
Output gap  0.0692 
(2.78) 
***    
0.0764    
(3.09) 
*** 
0.0616   
(2.45) 
**    
0.0776     
(3.10) 
*** 
0.0647    
(2.56) 
*** 
0.0664    
(2.65) 
*** 
0.0654    
(2.59) 
*** 






0.0698     
(2.76) 
*** 
0.0645    
(2.51) 
** 
0.0562    
(2.23) 
** 
0.0621    
(2.46) 
** 
Asset prices    0.0209    
(4.32) 
*** 
            
Asset prices (t-
1)) 
                 -0.0069
(-1.42)    
Residential 
property prices 
      0.0300    
(3.50) 
***    






        0.0056    
(0.65)    
             0.0131 
(1.45) 
Equity prices            0.0085    
(2.62) 
*** 





                         -0.0023
(-0.71)     
-0.0019
(-0.56)    
Commercial 
property prices 




(1.23)    












  60Table 3 continued 
Yield curve 
slope 
            -0.0472   
(-1.30)    
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
                 -0.0501





0.527                        0.435 0.693 0.522 0.648
 
0.549 0.686 0.596 0.847 0.640
 
0.831 0.554 0.555 



























0.993    0.989





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 






































































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
5 lags of 
CDXY and 
Debt  
The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY, and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-






Notes: Dependent variables: Current revenues excluding interest receipts as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, 








  61Table 4 Primary balances 1970-1990 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Primary 
balance (t-1) 
0.7981    
(19.26) 
*** 
0.7612    
(17.03) 
*** 
0.7489    
(16.47) 
*** 
0.7692    
(17.39) 
*** 
0.7634     
(16.74) 
*** 
0.7834    
(17.85) 
*** 
0.7713    
(17.14) 
*** 






0.7318    
(15.56) 
*** 
0.7282    
(14.01) 
***    





***    
Debt (t-1)  0.0068    
(1.39) 
0.0089    
(1.74)* 
0.0099     
(1.95)* 
0.0079    
(1.55) 
0.0094     
(1.81)* 
0.0089    
(1.74)* 
0.0099    
(1.89)* 
0.0059    
(1.17) 
0.0079    
(1.49) 
0.0062    
(1.19) 
0.0090    
(1.70)* 
0.0075    
(1.69) 
* 
0.0072    
(1.59) 
Output gap  0.2520 
(4.58) 
***    
0.2752    
(4.83) 
*** 
0.2610    
(4.56) 
*** 
0.2619    
(4.63) 
*** 
0.2616    
(4.49) 
*** 
0.2608    
(4.60) 
*** 






0.2379    
(3.92) 
*** 
0.2226    
(3.83) 
*** 
0.2410    
(3.98) 
*** 
0.2031    
(4.01) 
*** 
0.2017    
(3.97) 
*** 
Asset prices    0.0402    
(2.12)** 
            
Asset prices  
(t-1)) 
    0.0405    
(2.13)** 
           
Residential 
property prices 
      0.0330    
(1.82)* 





        0.0199    
(1.08)    
               0.0282 
(1.44) 
Equity prices            0.0086    
(1.17)    




                            0.0129 
(1.76)* 
 0.0089 
(1.13)    
Commercial 
property prices 
                   0.0287   
(2.77)**
* 






                   0.0045     
(0.40) 




            -0.0211   
(-0.34)    
Yield curve 
slope  (t-1) 
                   -0.0065










0.351                          0.239
 
0.131 0.234 0.135 0.299 0.078 0.164 0.187 0.153 0.106 0.351 0.290





0.427                          0.994 0.996 0.993 0.997 0.992 0.998 0.999 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.952 0.932





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
PBY and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to 













































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
6 lags of 
Debt. 
 
The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
PBY and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-





Notes: Dependent variables: Primary Balances as a percent of GDP (PBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009b). Year dummy 
variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
a Not robust, but not weakened 















  63Table 5 Primary balances 1991-2005 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Primary 
balance (t-1) 
0.8977    
(24.18) 
*** 
0.8819    
(28.89) 
*** 
0.8998    
(22.05) 
*** 
0.8777    
(25.83) 
*** 
0.9030    
(24.37) 
*** 
0.8817    
(23.10) 
*** 
0.8973    
(22.60) 
*** 
0.9096    
(22.39) 
*** 
0.9093    
(20.69) 
*** 
0.8776    
(24.05) 
***     
0.9090    
(20.33) 
*** 
0.9044    
(26.12) 
*** 
0.9071    
(26.38) 
*** 
Debt (t-1)  -0.0039 
(-1.01)    
-0.0029 
 (-0.84)    
-0.0038 
(-1.00)    
-0.0026 
(-0.89)    
-0.0039     












(-0.97)    
-0.0044 
(-1.13)    
-0.0043 
(-1.29)     
Output gap  -0.0943 
(-1.61)    
-0.0850 




(-1.61)    
-0.1014 
(-1.84)*    
-0.1233 
(-
2.28)**   
-0.0881 
(-1.59)    
-0.0990 
(-1.62)    
-0.0912 





(-1.82)*   
-0.0783 
(-1.24)    
-0.0994 
(-1.70)*    
Asset prices    0.0355    
(4.36) 
*** 
              
Asset prices (t-
1)) 




      0.0508    
(2.41) 
 ** 
                 0.0506 
(3.17) 




                       -0.0053
(-0.022)   
 0.0104 
(0.46) 
Equity prices            0.0258    
(2.14) 
** 





                         0.0008
(0.10) 




                 -0.0104
(-0.79) 
-0.0182   
(-1.97) 




                 -0.0254 
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0.370                          0.240 0.376 0.401 0.370 0.301 0.371 0.372 0.418 0.332 0.412 0.370 0.400





0.029   0.171   0.096   0.076   0.116 
 
0.178   0.103 
 






0.086   0.126  


























































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
6 lags of 
Debt. 
 
The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
PBY and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-






Notes: Dependent variables: Primary Balances as a percent of GDP (PBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009b). Year dummy 
variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, but not weakened by 
many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a). In all cases the Hansen test (which is robust but can be weakened by many instruments) points to non rejection of the null that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid (p-values in all columns approach 1) 
  65Table 6  Current expenditure excluding interest payments as a % of GDP – 1970-1990 






0.9108    
(26.94) 
*** 
0.8930    
(21.00) 
*** 
0.9092      
(25.02) 
*** 
0.8989    
(20.51) 
*** 
0.9103    
(24.87) 
*** 
0.8957    
(24.10) 
*** 
0.9024    
(24.69) 
*** 
0.8747    
(20.49) 
*** 
0.9014     
(21.55) 
*** 
0.8830    
(19.41) 
*** 
0.9157    
(29.08) 
*** 








0.1008    
(2.71) 
*** 
0.1195    
(2.57) 
** 
0.1022     
(2.60) 
***    
0.1143    
(2.46) 
0.1014    
(2.57) 
*** 
0.1199    
(2.83) 
*** 
0.1104     
(2.69) 
*** 
0.1391    
(2.81) 
*** 
0.1115    
(2.52) 
** 
0.1335    
(2.64) 
***  *** 
0.0904    
(2.88) 
*** 
0.0826    
(2.64) 
*** 
Debt (t-1)  -0.012958 
(-1.10) 
-0.0102    
(-5.29) 
***    
-0.0161 
(-5.45) 
***    
-0.0102 
(-5.38) 
***    
-0.0104 
(-5.59) 
***    
-0.0103    
(-4.49) 
***    
-0.0111 
(-4.96) 
***    
-0.0093  
(-4.96) 
***       
-0.0094 
(-4.62) 
***    
-0.0089 
(-4.19) 
***    
-0.0099 
 (-4.58) 
***    
-0.0094 
(-6.39) 
***    
-0.0087 
(-4.89) 
***     




***     
-0.1283 
(-4.56) 
***    
-0.1203 
(-3.93) 
***    
-0.1273    
(-4.47) 
***    
-0.1203 
(-3.88) 
***    
-0.1238 
(-4.33) 
***    
-0.1026 
(-3.28) 
***    
-0.1149 
(-
3.55)***   
-0.1013 
(-3.33) 
***    
-0.1129 
 (-3.39) 
***    
-0.1110 
(-4.39) 
***    
-0.1036 
(-3.71) 
***    
Asset prices    0.0019 
(0.13)    
            
Asset prices (t-
1)) 




                    -0.0024
(-0.14)    
0.0046
(0.27)      




                         0.0067
(0.33) 
 0.0076   
(0.38) 
Equity prices            -0.0005 
(-0.09)     
           0.0032
(0.64)    
   
Equity prices 
(t-1) 
                  -0.0109
(-3.84) 
***     
 -0.0097
 (-4.44) 
***    
Commercial 
property prices 
                 -0.0092
(-1.88)*    
-0.0108   
(-2.64) 




             -0.0023
(-0.27) 




            -0.0189   
(-0.29)    
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
                 -0.1036
(-1.24)    
  66Table 6 continued 
 





0.727                          0.929 0.773 0.933 0.676 0.935 0.858 0.812 0.379 0.798 0.589 0.690 0.723





0.065  0.131    0.063  0.126  0.095  0.126  0.053                0.380 0.122 0.789 0.393 0.137 0.117





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CDXY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 














































































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
5 lags of 
CRXY and 
Debt. 
The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CDXY, and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-






Notes: Dependent variables: Current expenditure excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Roodman (2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, but cannot be  weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a). 
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Table 7 Current expenditure excluding interest payments as a % of GDP – 1991-2005 























































































































Asset prices    -0.03693 
(-0.44) 
            
Asset prices (t-
1)) 
















Equity prices            0.01102 
(0.19) 










               0.0235 
(0.41) 
















  68Table 7 continued 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 






0.165                        0.228 0.267 0.392 0.091 0.084 0.233 0.315 0.345 0.292 0.211 0.126 0.160 





0.121                          0.247 0.205 0.944 0.256 0.204 0.430 0.115 0.667 0.108 0.620 0.123 0.199





The t-2 to 
t-3 lags of 
CDXY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 

































































































































The t-2 to 






the t-3 to t-
5 lags of 
CRXY and 
Debt 
The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CDXY, 
and ygap 
and the t-3 
to t-5 lags 
of CRXY, 




Notes: Dependent variables: Current expenditire excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step difference GMM, see Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Roodman (2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
a Not robust, but cannot be  weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a).
 bA collapsed instrument set was used according to Roodman (2009b).
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Table 8 Current revenue excluding interest receipts as a % of GDP- 1970-1990  




0.9642    
(32.62) 
*** 
0.9312    
(29.76) 
*** 
0.9518    
(29.06) 
*** 






0.9494     
(30.55) 
*** 
0.9590    
(30.19) 
*** 
0.8987    
(25.30) 
*** 
0.9458    
(23.63) 
*** 
0.8984    
(25.17) 
*** 
0.9395    
(23.29) 
*** 
0.9507    
(31.87) 
*** 






0.0344    
(1.14) 
0.0676    
(2.14) 
** 
0.0487    
(1.48)    




0.0471   
(1.50) 
0.0412    
(1.29) 
0.0910   
(2.64) 
*** 
0.0504    
(1.32) 
0.0934    
(2.68) 
*** 
0.0602      
(1.55) 
0.0479    
(1.55) 
0.0555    
(1.77)* 
Debt (t-1)  -0.0028 
(-0.82)     
-0.0009 
 (-0.28)    
-0.0019 
(-0.56)    
-0.0022    




(-0.32)    
-0.0023 
(-0.65)    
-0.0028 
(-0.81)    
-0.0021 
(-0.59)     
-0.0019 
(-0.56)     
-0.0016 
   (-0.44)   
-0.0035 
(-1.01)    
-0.0026 
(-0.76)     
Output gap  0.0917    
(2.37) 
*** 
0.1075    
(2.75) 
*** 
0.0777   
(1.97) 
** 






0.0938    
(2.40) 
** 
0.0772   
(1.96) 
** 
0.0755    
(1.90)* 
0.0765   
(1.85)*    
0.0790    
(1.99) 
**    
0.0805    
(1.94)* 
0.0666 
(1.67)*    
0.0712    
(1.79)* 
Asset prices    0.0429   
(3.33) 
***     
            
Asset prices (t-
1)) 
    0.0124    
(0.94) 
           
Residential 
property prices 













**    
Equity prices            0.0093     
(1.83)*    
         0.0074       
(1.37)     
Equity prices 
(t-1) 
                      -0.0002
(-0.04) 
 0.0003 
(0.05)    
Commercial 
property prices 
                   0.0216   
(3.04) 
***    







                 -0.0059 
(-0.76)    
-0.0093




  70Table 8 continued 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Yield curve 
slope 
            -0.0221   
(-0.44)    
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
                 -0.0620









0.857 0.406 0.729 0.781 





0.694                          0.970 0.877 0.975 0.886 0.949 0.851 0.972 0.906 0.999 0.995 0.972 0.956





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 




































































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
5 lags of 
CDXY and 
Debt  
The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY, and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-






Notes: Dependent variables: Current revenues excluding interest receipts as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
a Not robust, 
but it cannot be  weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a). 
  71Table 9  Current revenue excluding interest receipts as a % of GDP-1991-2005  




0.9499    
(38.44) 
*** 
0.9423    
(36.69) 
*** 
0.9626    
(38.71) 
*** 
0.9376     
(38.38) 
*** 
0.9549    
(38.43) 
*** 
0.9416    
(38.53) 
*** 






0.9627     
(38.12) 
*** 
0.9428     
(37.33) 
*** 
0.9671    
(37.80) 
*** 
0.9499    
(38.42) 
*** 








**    
0.0543    
(2.26) 
** 





0.0473    
(1.89)* 
0.0578    
(2.34) 
** 




0.0397    
(1.55) 
0.0524    
(2.07) 
** 
0.0358    
(1.40) 
0.0514    
(2.04) 
** 
0.0459    
(1.82)* 
Debt (t-1)  -0.0013 
(-0.68)    
-0.0010 
   (-0.56)    
-0.0016 




  (-0.85)   
-0.0013 
   (-0.71)    
-0.0012 
   (-0.66)   
-0.0014 
 (-0.74)    
-0.0014 
   (-0.78)   
-0.0007 
    (-
0.39)    
-0.0015 
   (-0.82)   
-0.0011 
(-0.57)    
-0.0014 
(-0.73)    
Output gap  0.0109     
(0.25) 
0.0082    
(0.20)    
0.0028       
(0.07) 
0.0131    
(0.31)    
0.0077    
(0.18) 
0.0081    
(0.19) 




-0.0076   
(-0.18) 
-0.0083 
   (-0.20)   
-0.0083    
(-0.19) 
-0.0028 
(-0.07)    
-0.0051 
(-0.12)    
Asset prices    0.0159       
(3.33) 
*** 
            
Asset prices 
 (t-1) 
                 -0.0119
 (-2.44) 
**    
Residential 
property prices 
      0.0363    
(2.82) 
*** 






                    -0.0111
  (-0.85)   
-0.0041
   (-0.30)    
Equity prices            0.0071  
(1.61) 




                        -0.0062
 (-1.40)   
 -0.0038
(-0.86)    
Commercial 
property prices 
               -0.0045
  (-0.61)    
  -0.0119    





               -0.0148   
 (-2.19) 
**    
-0.0118
   (-1.69)   
Yield curve 
slope 
            -0.0550   
(-0.82)    
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Table 9 continued 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
                -0.0224


















0.032                          0.571 0.173 0.475 0.528 0.560 0.547 0.585 0.648 0.982 0.980 0.572 0.495





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 





































































































































The t-2 to 





the t-3 to t-
5 lags of 
CDXY and 
Debt.  
The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CRXY, and 
ygap and 
the t-3 to t-






Notes: Dependent variables: Current revenues excluding interest receipts as a percent of GDP(CDXY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Roodman (2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, but it cannot be  weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a). 
  73Table 10: Cyclically adjusted primary balances - CAPBY 
            1 2 3 4 5 6                7 8 9 10 11 12 13
CAPBY(t-1)  0.8887    
(41.50) 
***    
0.8766    
(41.85) 
*** 
0.8839    
(39.39) 
*** 
0.8712    
(41.01) 
***    






0.8863    
(40.15) 
*** 
0.8836    
(39.92) 
***     
0.8855    
(39.14) 
*** 
0.8714    
(40.02) 
*** 
0.8806    
(38.18) 
*** 
0.9021    
(45.12) 
*** 
0.9019    
(45.00) 
*** 
Debt (t-1)  0.0058    
(2.63) 
***    
0.0067    
(3.14) 
***  
0.0061       
(2.73) 
*** 
0.0068     
(3.14) 
*** 
0.0060    
(2.70) 
*** 
0.0059   
(2.75) 
***    
0.0059   
(2.69) 
*** 
0.0058    
(2.65) 
*** 
0.0059     
(2.67) 
*** 
0.0069    
(3.18) 
*** 
0.0063    
(2.79) 
*** 
0.0052    
(2.53) 
***    
0.0051    
(2.46) 
*** 
Output gap  0.0458 
(1.47)   
0.0484    
(1.60)  
0.0459    
(1.45) 
0.0453    
(1.49)  
 
0.0439    
(1.38) 
0.0365      
(1.18) 
0.0417    
(1.31) 
0.0351    
(1.10) 
0.0376    
(1.17) 
0.0274     
(0.88) 
0.0333    
(1.02) 
0.0305 
   (1.03)    
0.0259    
(0.89) 
Asset prices    0.0366    
(5.77) 
***    
            
Asset prices  
(t-1) 





      0.0551    
(4.71) 
*** 






        0.0076    
(0.61) 
               0.0124 
(0.96) 
Equity prices            0.0125 
(2.88) 
***    










                   0.0093   
(1.44) 






               -0.0010   
(-0.16) 
-0.0034
   (-0.50) 
Yield curve 
slope 






  74Table 10 continued 
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 






0.689                        0.940 0.498 0.489 0.577 0.862 0.513 0.803 0.636 0.719 0.596 0.894
 
0.875 





0.412                          0.844 0.826 0.775 0.796 0.784 0.820 0.824 0.790 1.000 1.000 0.422 0.422





The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
CAPBY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 














































































































The t-2 to 






the t-3 to t-
6 lags of 
Debt. 
 
The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
CAPBY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 
to t-6 lags 




Notes: Dependent variables:Cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (CAPBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot 
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Table 11: Cyclically adjusted primary balances – 1970-1990 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
CAPBY (t-1)  0.8320    
(19.08) 
*** 
0.8281    
(19.19) 
*** 
0.8109     
(17.21) 
*** 
0.8289    
(19.58) 
*** 
0.8206    
(17.39) 
*** 






0.8070    
(17.19) 
*** 
0.7997    
(15.12) 
*** 
0.8200    
(17.67) 
*** 
0.8003    
(14.90) 
***    
0.8655    
(21.64) 
*** 
0.8641    
(21.57) 
***    
Debt (t-1)  0.0097 
(2.04) 
** 
0.0115   
(2.43) 
** 
0.0114     
(2.31) 
** 
0.0104     
(2.25) 
** 
0.01069   
(2.16) 
** 
0.0106    
(2.22) 
** 
0.0110    
(2.22) 
** 
0.0098       
(2.01) 
** 
0.0107    
(2.13) 
** 
0.0109    
(2.28) 
** 
0.0112     
(2.20) 
** 
0.0101       
(2.41) 
** 
0.0102    
(2.42) 
** 
Output gap  0.1323     
(2.34) 
**    
0.1482   
(2.64) 
*** 
0.1405    
(2.39) 
** 
0.1250    
(2.28) 
** 
0.1446    
(2.44) 
** 
0.1388    
(2.45) 
** 
0.1454    
(2.45) 
** 
0.1070    
(1.79)* 
0.1329    
(2.11) 
** 
0.1012     
(1.72)* 
0.1304    
(2.04) 
** 
0.0967    
(1.87)* 
0.0983    
(1.91)* 
Asset prices    0.0505    
(2.80) 
*** 
            
Asset prices (t-
1)) 
    0.0281    
(1.46) 
           
Residential 
property prices 
      0.0622    
(3.47) 
*** 






        0.0074    
(0.38)    
               0.0149 
(0.71) 
Equity prices            0.0094    
(1.28)    




                          0.0083 
(1.13) 
 0.0036 
(0.44)    
Commercial 
property prices 
                   0.0220   
(2.12) 
** 






                 0.0011     
(0.09) 




            -0.0198   




  76Table 11 continued 
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
                -0.0226





0.394                        0.348
 
0.277 0.347 0.293 0.500 0.224 0.444 0.351
 
0.460 0.270 0.788 0.736 





0.922                          1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.993





The t-2 to 
t-4 lags of 
CAPBY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 













































































































The t-2 to 






the t-3 to t-
6 lags of 
Debt. 
 
The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
CAPBY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 
to t-6 lags 




Notes: Dependent variables: Cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (CAPBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, 













  77Table 12: Cyclically adjusted primary balances – 1991-2005 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
CAPBY(t-1)  0.9352     0.9266  0.9384  0.9267  0.9437  0.9327  0.9354    0.9431  0.9416  0.9302  0. 9453     0.9363 
(39.97)  (41.69)  (39.34)  (38.12)  (38.56)  (40.50)  (39.57)  (39.62)  (39.50)  (38.29)  (38.01)  (40.21) 




Debt (t-1)  -0.0004 
 (-0.18)    
0.0005 
 (0.21)    
-0.0005 
 (-0.21)    
0.0002 
 (0.08)    
-0.0009 








 (-0.26)    
0.00003   
(0.01) 
-0.0009 
 (-0.38)    
-0.0006 
 (-0.21)    
-0.0009  
(-0.37)     
Output gap  -0.1502    
(-3.39) 
***    
-0.1536 
 (-3.66) 
***    
-0.1514 
(-3.46) 
***     
-0.1496 
 (-3.41) 
***    
-0.1552 
(-3.53) 
***     
-0.1733 
 (-3.87) 
***    
-0.1474 
 (-3.29) 
***    
-0.1474 
 (-3.33) 
***    
-0.1554  
(-3.58) 












***    
Asset prices    0.0312 
(5.35) 
*** 
              
Asset prices (t-
1)) 




            0.0215
(1.27) 
          0.0258      




                   -0.0156
(-0.92)    
 -0.0047
 (-0.26) 
Equity prices            0.0141    
(2.50) 
** 











                 -0.0128
 (-1.35) 
-0.0173     
(-1.87) 




                 -0.0161 























0.768                          0.622 0.809 0.661 0.688 0.798 0.769 0.711 0.729 0.606 0.708 0.775 0.734








































































































































The t-2 to 






the t-3 to t-
6 lags of 
Debt. 
 
The t-2 to 
t-5 lags of 
CAPBY 
and ygap 
and the t-3 
to t-6 lags 




Notes: Dependent variables: Cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (CAPBY). Estimator : One step system GMM, see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Roodman 
(2009b). Year dummy variables were used to reduce omitted variable bias. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses. 
aNot robust, 
but not weakened by many instruments (see Roodman, 2009a). 
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Table 13: Robustness- Primary balance/GDP 
  Impact of financial and real estate variables on primary balance excluding  










































































































































































































































  80Table 13 continued 
  Impact of financial and real estate variables on primary balance excluding 






























































































































































































































Notes: Impact of financial and real estate variables on primary balance excluding, in turn, Australia, Canada, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and United States. The coefficient estimates are comparable to those in Table 1 (colunns 1-13). In brackets we report the coefficient estimates from the 
joint estimation of residential, commercial property and equity prices (the contemporaneous values correspond to the estimates in column 10 of Table 1, whereas the lagged values 
correspond to the estimates in column 11 of  Table 1). *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The Z statistics are in  parentheses.  
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Table 14 Robustness- Current revenue/GDP 
  Impact of financial and real estate variables on current revenues excluding  
  AUS                          CAN ESP FIN FRA UK IRE JPN NTL NOR NZL SWE US


































































































































































































































  82Table 14 continued 
  Impact of financial and real estate variables on current revenues excluding 































































































































































































































Notes: Impact of financial and real estate variables on primary balance excluding, in turn, Australia, Canada, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and United States. The coefficient estimates are comparable to those in Table 3 (colunns 1-13). In brackets we report the coefficient estimates from the 
joint estimation of residential, commercial property and equity prices (the contemporaneous values correspond to the estimates in column 10 of Table 3, whereas the lagged values 




  83Table 15 Robustness- Cyclically adjusted primary balance/GDP 
  Impact of financial and real estate variables on cylically adjusted primary balance excluding  



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































eal estate variables on primary balance excluding, in turn, Australia, Canada, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, 
, New Zealand, Sweden, and United States. The coefficient estimates are comparable to those in Table 10 (colunns 1-13). In brackets we report the coefficient estimates from the
residential, commercial property and equity prices (the contemporaneous values correspond to the estimates in column 10 of Table 10, whereas the lagged values 













Notes: Impact of financial and r
Norway
joint estimation of 
correspond to
 
 Table 16:Summary of financial and real estate variables’ impact on primary 
balances 
 Primary  balance/GDP  Cyclically adjusted primary balance/GDP 
  1970-2005 1970-1990 1991-2005 1970-2005 1970-1990 1991-2005 
Asset prices  0.0368    0.0402   
 
0.0355 0.0366 0.0505 0.0312 
Asset prices 
 (t-1) 

















0.0262     
 
 
     
Equity prices  0.0129-










  0.0129        
Commercial 
property prices 








   -0.0252  to 
 - 0.0254  




       
Yield curve 
slope (t-1) 
       
Notes: The table summarizes the statistically significant coefficient estimates of the impact of financial and real 
estate variables on fiscal variables. The results are read as follows: a 1% increase in e.g., residential property 
prices increases contemporaneously the ratio of primary balance to GDP by about 0.047-0.049pp in the whole 
sample case, with the impact effect increasing over time, i.e. from 0.033pp in 1970-1990 to about 0.05pp in 1991-
2005. Moreover, there is also a significant lagged effect amounting to 0.022-0.026pp but only in the whole 
sample case. 
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Table 17: Summary of financial and real estate variables’ impact on current 
expenditure and revenue 
  Current expenditure/GDP   Current revenue/GDP 
 1970-2005  1970-1990  1991-2005  1970-2005  1970-1990  1991-2005 












  -0.2111 0.0298-









      0.0275  
Equity prices       0.0077-





  -0.0097 to 
-0.0109 







-0.0092 to  
-0.0108 










  -0.0078 to   
-0.0088 
 










  -0.49032     
Notes: The table summarizes the statistically significant coefficient estimates of the impact of financial and real 
estate variables on fiscal variables. The results are read as follows: a 1% increase in e.g., residential property 
prices increases contemporaneously the ratio of current revenue to GDP by about 0.03pp in the whole sample 
case, with the impact effect increasing over time, i.e. from 0.026-0.027pp in 1970-1990 to about 0.036-0.04pp in 
1991-2005. Moreover, there is also a significant lagged effect amounting to 0.0275pp but only in the period 1970-
1990. Furthermore, a 1pp (100 basis points) increase in the differential between the long and short-term nominal 
interest rates reduces expenditure to GDP ratio by about 0.186-0.221pp in the whole sample case and by 0.490-
0.587 in the period 1991-2005. 
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Table 18 Correlations 
 1970-2005  1970-1990  1991-2005 
    Correlation of ygap with 
AP  0.1916  0.2587     0.1715    
RAP  0.0295     -0.0388     0.0744    
RP  0.4530  0.4532     0.4807    
RRP  0.0100     0.0510     0.0122    
EP  -0.2077  -0.3004     -0.1217    
REP  0.0053     -0.1763     0.1548    
CP  0.2611  0.2241     0.2765    
RCP  0.0302     -0.0461     0.0564    
Yield curve slope  -0.1784  -0.1783  -0.1463 
 
Correlation of CP with 
RP  0.4571     0.4555     0.5177    
EP  0.2961     0.2615     0.3549    
Correlation of RP with 
EP  0.1185     0.0659     0.1955    
  Correlation of RCP with 
RRP 0.3083  0.3464  0.3454 
REP 0.2840  0.3087  0.2563 
Correlation of RRP with 
REP 0.0961  0.0759  0.1330 
Correlation of DILS with 
LGGDY  0.2591     0.1977  0.2422 
Correlations (1970-2005) 
 AP  RP  EP  CP 
RAP  0.8914          
RRP    0.8409        
REP      0.9059      
RCP     0.8827       
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Table 19 Summary statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
PBY  0.17722      3.32394    -11.7558     12.9902 
CAPBY  0.04343      3.12310    -9.53656     7.43622 
Debt  58.9626      28.6831     7.96639     172.074 
CDXY  38.5538     8.46198     15.8003     62.7384 
CRXY  40.6954      8.53872     20.6407     59.1518 
YGAP  -0.56167      2.35083    -11.4463     6.73591 
AP  2.83095      11.0587    -27.5545     139.502 
RAP  6.80e-09      10.0222    -27.0028     129.856 
RP  2.57458       7.59495    -19.7993     40.1670 
RRP  3.69e-09      6.35355    -17.6283     31.3175 
EP  4.49251      21.2498    -49.7364  98.64 
REP  2.59e-08      19.0416    -43.8561      82.6511 
CP  0.79940      12.4594     -40.0371     44.0577 
RCP  2.17e-08  11.07913     -42.0715     40.3378 
Yield curve slope  0.43761     1.74619    -6.32591     4.79762 
Inflation   5.65651      4.84874    -10.1527     27.1313 
Nominal long-term 
interest rate 
8.51604         3.40042      1.00325     21.2480 
Nominal short-term 
interest rate 
8.07842       4.29132       0.02895       23.305 
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Table 20 Summary statistics 1970-1990 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
PBY  -0.51971    3.0444   -9.2566    8.61022 
CAPBY  -0.81167    2.7326   -8.9215  7.14310 
Debt  49.6566    23.024    7.96639    126.135 
CDXY  37.0692    8.3599    15.8003    56.7759 
CRXY  38.9343    8.7086    20.6407    59.1518 
YGAP  -0.30075    2.3595   -6.3484    6.73591 
AP  1.968008    8.5643   -22.3304    35.6363 
RAP  -1.06713    7.4928    -20.2528    27.1943 
RP  2.115219    8.3589  -15.4892    40.1670 
RRP  -0.92058    7.1424   -17.6283  31.3175 
EP  3.188323    22.3019   -49.7364    98.64 
REP  -0.44801    20.5517   -43.8561    82.6511 
CP  3.338467    13.3795   -34.9223    42.4157 
RCP  2.081891    12.5769    -42.0715    40.3378 
Yield curve slope  -0.04013    1.92209   -6.32591    4.79762 
Inflation   8.229965    4.74932   -0.72918    27.1313 
Nominal long-term 








Table 21 Summary statistics 1991-2005 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
PBY  1.06821    3.45669   -11.7558    12.9902 
CAPBY  0.93544    3.25773   -9.53656    7.43622 
Debt  68.2685    30.7380    14.38604    172.074 
CDXY  40.5392    8.20169   22.84792    62.7384 
CRXY  42.9468    7.77023    27.9136    58.5235 
YGAP  -0.8747    2.30615   -11.4463    4.78277 
AP  3.97817    13.6233   -27.5545    139.502 
RAP  1.13827    12.0660   -27.0028    129.856 
RP  3.18526    6.4059   -19.7993  18.9875 
RRP  0.98195    5.22412   -9.72640    14.3386 
EP  6.23143    19.6688   -44.0347  83.2150 
REP  0.47788    17.3140   -43.2816  74.3976 
CP  -1.6301    10.9994   -40.0371    44.0577 
RCP  -1.8124    9.23667   -30.7334    35.8222 
Yield curve slope  0.99968    1.30953   -5.00166    3.68666 
Inflation   2.22525    2.04731  -10.1527    15.6511 
Nominal long-term 
interest rate  6.20850    2.25624    1.00325    13.2820 
Nominal short-term 
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